Trust-transparency paradoxes: proceedings of an international conference

Professor Alistair Cole

September 2018

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ELICO, EA 4147
SCIENCES PO LYON
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Acknowledgements:

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Figure 1: Participants at the Lyon conference

From left to right: Stuart Fox (Cardiff University, WISERD), Jerome Reneaudin (National Federation of Disabled-friendly Companies), Paul Chaney (Cardiff University, WISERD), Benedicte Ollaigne (Life Coach), Sally Power (Cardiff University, WISERD), Christophe Parnet (Sciences Po Lyon, TRIANGLE), Dominic Heinz (Cardiff University, WISERD), Thibault Riouffreyt (TRIANGLE), Caroline Ancely (Editorial Assistant), Hélène Buisson-Fenet (École normale supérieure, CNRS, TRIANGLE), Alistair Cole (Sciences Po Lyon, TRIANGLE, WISERD), Isabelle Garcin-Moreau (Sciences Po Lyon, ELICO), Simon Gadras (University of Lyon 2, ELICO), Cécile Robert (Sciences Po Lyon, TRIANGLE), Olivier Quéré (TRIANGLE), Jeanne Chauvel (Sciences Po Rennes, ARENES), Daniel Franji (École normale supérieure, TRIANGLE), Ian Rees Jones (Cardiff University, WISERD), Thomas Scapin (Sciences Po Lyon, TRIANGLE), Ian Stafford (Cardiff University, WISERD).
Abstract: A word of introduction from Alistair Cole, conference organiser

This short publication presents the main proceedings of an international conference held at Sciences Po Lyon, France, on 4 May 2018. The symposium pulled together several research initiatives around the central theme of trust–transparency paradoxes. Trust (and its corollary mistrust) lies at the heart of contemporary debates regarding governance and democracy. Key debates focus on whether the level of trust in democracy is rising or falling over time and the extent to which citizen trust is a prerequisite for good democratic government. Problems of democratic deficit, of the misfit between politics and policy, and of political corruption apparently undermine trust in politicians and underpin the emergence in most EU polities of forms of populist party responses. A recent study by the Herbert Quandt Stiftung foundation (2013), for example, indicates that, while the public has confidence in democracy as a concept, many do not trust government and the way democracy is currently being implemented. Despite calls for more citizen involvement in decision-making, however, citizen engagement and satisfaction rates are declining. There is a strong and growing demand for more diverse and effective forms of citizen engagement to increase levels of trust and engage an increasingly diverse, busy and complex urban population.

Is transparency a necessary condition to restore citizen trust in a post-democratic époque (Crouch, 2004)? In one version of modern democratic theory, transparency is framed in terms of building confidence via accountability and participation and enhancing trust on account of fairness and open procedures. For ‘optimists’, transparency is seen as a potential driver of improved governmental performance. For ‘pessimists’, transparency might hinder trust, by unnecessarily disrupting existing networks and mechanisms that provide public goods. Transparency is sometimes offered as a remedy to tackle the problems that ostensibly produce such distrust, but understandings of transparency are deeply ambivalent.

Hence the title of the conference – trust–transparency paradoxes – refers to the puzzle that trust might require transparency (the argument for open government), yet transparency can undermine trust (at least in decision-making systems that require a measure of confidentiality). Centred on the overarching theme of trust–transparency paradoxes, the conference panels were organised on the relationship between trust and transparency in a context of multi-level governance; on the links between trust and co-construction of public policies; and on trust as a factor of resilience in relations between associations and state and non-state actors, especially in the educational field.

The day provided the occasion to celebrate two important research collaborations, one international, the other within the Lyon area. The international collaboration was that between the TRIANGLE, the main Lyon-based social science research laboratory, and
WISERD, the research centre representing the leading social science cluster of Welsh universities (the partnership is presented immediately below). Within Lyon, the day marked the dissemination of the research project undertaken by the research units ELICO and TRIANGLE, within the context of the Sciences Po Lyon Scientific Council.

This symposium also represented a milestone in the dissemination of the results of the WISERD Civil Society and WISERD Education programmes. Three of the papers reported findings from ongoing projects from WISERD Civil Society (Chauvel, Cole and Pasquier; Stafford and Heinz; and Chaney) while Sally Power and Chris Taylor presented provisional findings from their collaboration with Daniel Franji (a TRIANGLE researcher) and Philippe Vitale. The conference also heard provisional findings from the Building Trust through Transparency project, led by Alistair Cole and Isabelle Garcin-Marrou (Sciences Po Lyon, ELICO) and funded by the Scientific Council of Sciences Po Lyon (2016–2018). The project benefited from generous funding from the PALSE (ANR – IDEX – 007) of Lyon University. Thanks go to the various funders (ESRC, ANR, Sciences Po Lyon, TRIANGLE) whose support was invaluable for enabling the conference to take place.

The ensuing publication does not present a literal translation or transcription of each intervention but pulls together common themes from most of the interventions and presents broad-based findings that will be of interest beyond the narrow confines of academia.

**Keywords:** Trust; Transparency; Wales; France; Civil Society; Regions; Education; Public Services.
1. Introduction: The WISERD–TRIANGLE partnership


3. Trust–transparency dynamics in the UK and Germany – Ian Stafford and Dominic Heinz

4. Trust and transparency in media discourses: Paradoxical representations of the glyphosate controversy – Lise Jaquet, Isabelle Garcin-Moreau and Simon Gadras

5. Europe’s ambivalent transparency – Cécile Robert

6. Trust, territoriality and third sector engagement in policy-making and welfare provision: Exploring the trust pathologies of welfare pluralism – Paul Chaney and Christala Sophocleous


8. The role of political alienation in the UK’s Brexit vote – Stuart Fox

9. Restructuring the state: Mid-level bureaucrats between loss of autonomy and empowerment – Julien Barrier and Olivier Quéré


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12. Accountable and/or responsible? School accountability and its forum: Elements from a France–Quebec comparison – Hélène Buisson-Fenet

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1. Introduction: The WISERD–TRIANGLE partnership

(From WISERD NEWS, 9 May 2018: ‘WISERD conference in Lyon marks next step in European collaboration’)

In May 2018, the ‘Trust–Transparency Paradoxes’ conference marked the beginning of a formal collaborative agreement between WISERD and TRIANGLE in Lyon, France. The Memorandum of Understanding, signed on the eve of the conference, will support the development of exciting joint research projects, future academic exchanges and collaborative publications.

TRIANGLE and WISERD are both cross-institutional, multi-disciplinary centres of research excellence. While WISERD brings together researchers from the Universities of Aberystwyth, Bangor, Cardiff, South Wales and Swansea, TRIANGLE spans the Universities of Lyon, Lyon 2, École Normale Supérieure, Sciences Po, Jean Monnet in Saint-Étienne and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). Both institutions include researchers in the fields of sociology, social policy, politics, economics and education. Future collaborations will be focused on three main areas of interest: education; public policy and governance; associations and civil society.

The collaboration between TRIANGLE and WISERD has the potential to provide new and important insights into enduring and emerging political, social and economic issues in France, Wales and the UK. It builds on long-standing relationships between researchers in Cardiff and Lyon. WISERD Education Director, Professor Sally Power, has regularly been invited to the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) over the past decade, one of the most prestigious institutions in French higher education.

Professor Alistair Cole has been Professor at Sciences Po Lyon since 2015, on secondment from Cardiff University’s School of Law and Politics. He sits as an elected member of the TRIANGLE Scientific Committee and has a long-standing association with WISERD.

WISERD Director, Professor Ian Rees Jones, comments: ‘Our research has a deep concern for contemporary policy challenges and, with Europe, and the UK in particular, facing a period of considerable uncertainty, it is vital that we work with European partners to address the consequence of social, economic and political change. This agreement between TRIANGLE and WISERD offers a unique and exciting opportunity to build on our already close working relationships and to deepen and extend our joint activities in key areas, including education, policy innovation, comparative research on multi-level governance, trust and civil society, and city regions.’
Professor Gautier commented: ‘I look forward to fruitful future collaboration, especially in the context of TRIANGLE’s cross-cutting priority in the field of education and learning, as well as in the respective converging interests in cities, regions, governance and public policy.’

Professor Alistair Cole, who has organised the conference, comments: ‘The conference represents an important opportunity to discuss interim findings from the WISERD Civil Society research projects represented and is a concrete realisation of a shared internationalisation strategy that will benefit both TRIANGLE and WISERD.’
Figure 2: The conference poster
PANEL ONE: Trust–Transparency Paradoxes

The papers in this first panel explored the many trust–transparency paradoxes as they play themselves out at multiple levels of government. The first two papers presented interim findings of the WISERD Trust and Transparency in Multi-Level Governance project, while the third communication addressed French media discourses on trust and transparency during the glyphosate controversy of November 2017, as part of the parallel Sciences Po Lyon-funded project on Trust and Transparency. The final paper of this session was an investigation into the use of transparency as a tool to regulate lobbying at the level of the European Commission.

2. Trust–transparency paradoxes: Evidence from the French regions

Jeanne Chauvel, Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier

Jeanne Chauvel is a postdoctoral researcher, who was based at Sciences Po Rennes during the period of data collection. Alistair Cole is a member of the TRIANGLE research laboratory, as well as Professor of Comparative Politics at the Institute of Political Studies, Lyon, France, Professor of European Politics (on secondment) at Cardiff University and a member of WISERD. Romain Pasquier is CNRS Senior Researcher in the ARENES research laboratory, Rennes.

This paper presented interim findings from the French case in the Trust and Transparency in Multi-Level Governance project, mainly in the form of the findings of a mass level survey. The general context is one of a strong mistrust in political institutions and political leaders in France, confirmed by surveys over the past decade or so, notably the CEVIPOF’s trust barometer. Is transparency a remedy to tackle the problems that ostensibly produce such distrust? In France there have been repeated reforms designed to introduce more clarity into France’s complex sub-national mosaic, and to improve accountability and transparency for decision-making. The most recent and emblematic of these reforms was the redrawing of the regional map in 2015 to produce larger, fewer regions with strategic functions (22 to 13 regions). The survey was carried out in the context of this reform of the regions.

In terms of research design and methodology, we commissioned a nationwide survey of France’s new regions carried out by YouGov, from 7 to 11 October 2016. The sample size was 3,003 individuals (representative quotas of the French population over 18 years old). The survey was specifically weighted in relation to three French regions: one vast new
region (Nouvelle Aquitaine), a second merged one (Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes) and an unchanged one (Bretagne). In addition, we conducted around 40 semi-structured interviews in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes and Bretagne regions with local representatives, high public servants and heads of local firms/associations. The main research questions centred on the levels of trust in political institutions, the preferred levels of service delivery (cities, regions, nationwide and EU) and whether transparency and accountability might provide solutions for the lack of trust in political institutions.

In terms of definitions, trust was interpreted in the survey primarily in terms of competence, benevolence and honesty, while transparency was interpreted in terms of accountability, conflicts of interests and the role of interest in public decision-making.

Political trust involves an analysis of the relationship between a subject (the one who trusts) and an object (the one who is trusted). It concerns ‘either trust in particular politicians or trust in the main institutions of government and public life’ (Zmerli and Newton, 2011, p. 69). It is a ‘thin form’ of trust, or quasi-trust (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011, p. 3), not generally involving face-to-face contact.

The relationship between trust and transparency is highly complex. One of the underlying paradoxes of the project is that trust might require transparency (the argument for more open government), yet transparency can undermine trust (at least within existing policy communities or forums such as the European Council where confidentiality and saving face are important). These discussions take place within the context of two principal dimensions of multi-level governance. The first concerns multiple levels of delivery and regulation of public services (from local to European) and is captured in the survey by questions relating to the appropriate level of government for the delivery of a range of public policies. The second dimension concerns multiple interactions, often involving the private delivery of public goods, and is captured by questions on the role of lobbies and interests in policy formulation.

Three core findings were presented:

The first of these related to a deep mistrust in the functioning of democracy, including at the regional level. Since the decentralisation reforms of 1982, the French regions have over 30 years of democratic existence, and they have developed an enhanced political and administrative capacity (Cole, 2006; Pasquier, 2012). But they are poorly legitimised: fewer than one in two respondents declared that they were satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their region (46%), while a majority (52%) doubted that their regions had the capacity to develop their territory. These results differed somewhat according to partisan
proximity: the least hostile were supporters of the main parties having exercised regional-level responsibilities – namely the centre-left Socialists and the centre-right Republicans – while those identifying with the National Front (Front national – FN) or France Unbowed (La France insoumise – LFI) were much less likely to support the elected regions. On the other hand, there were relatively few demographic differences among respondents (according to generation, gender to socio-professional category), though there was some evidence of territorial effects (inhabitants of Paris being the most sceptical of the worth of regional institutions, while those in western France were the most enthusiastic). Strikingly, 12% declared they had no trust in any political institution to resolve the problems facing French society. These results are fully debated in an article in the Journal of Trust Research (Cole, et. al., 2018).

The second core finding related to the *territorial scales of trust*. The survey detailed trust in each level of government (local to EU levels) for several policies (for example, employment, housing and the environment). Though deeply ambivalent or hostile to all institutions, the survey suggests that French citizens show greater trust in two levels of government over the proposed alternatives: the city (for most routine matters of public policy) and the national government (for welfare provision, equality of treatment, national planning). Support for the intermediary levels of sub-national government (13 regions and 96 departments) was sector and place specific, but it provided a very thin form of legitimisation. The key absence from the survey was the European Union, barely identified at all as a significant actor even in fields where it manifestly performs a core role.

**Table 1: Which institution is most trustworthy to handle each policy issue?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protection</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National territory</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average 20% 13% 14% 9% 4% 30% 10%

Measures of trust in France’s regions varied according to place. If there is some sympathy for the region, this is more clearly affirmed in the case of the traditional region (Brittany) than in the merged regions of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes (a fusion of two regions) or in the geographically vast New Aquitaine (a merger of three former regions). There is a stronger degree of confidence in the region in Brittany than in the two other regions: 47% of the sample trusted the regional council to ensure territorial development, against 36% in Auvergne Rhône-Alpes and 34% in New Aquitaine. Likewise, in Brittany more confidence was expressed in the region to address the issue of employment than in the national government; the other two regions identified the central government as the lead actor. Even in the case of Brittany, however, the regional logic would appear to be squeezed by city and central state. In interviews, there was almost unanimous criticism of the process of merging the regions, which were described as being top-down, yet incremental and totally lacking in transparency.

The third core finding related to the demand for greater transparency and accountability. The figures from the survey were striking in this respect:

- 70% of those surveyed wanted to know more about the role of interest groups in the political process
- More than two thirds (69%) considered that existing laws regulating financial probity and conflicts of interest were insufficiently robust
- Almost nine of out every ten citizens surveyed believed that organisations ought to be accountable, rather than trusted to deliver without scrutiny.

These findings from France are consistent with those presented elsewhere (see Stafford and Heinz in these proceedings) and present a pessimistic picture of the state of contemporary democracy. Moreover, there appeared to be a misfit between politics and public opinion. The research team compared the findings in the survey with the coded questionnaires distributed to members of the policy communities in Brittany and Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes. The interview panel findings uncovered substantially different findings in relation to the transparency questions. In our practitioner sample, there was much less demand to know more about the role of interest groups in the political process, a logical conclusion given the status of the members of our interview panels. Rather more surprising, perhaps, around two thirds (69%) of the interview panel considered that existing laws regulating financial probity and conflicts of interest were sufficiently robust – almost the reverse of the proportion among the public. Various interpretations are possible, not least that the practitioner panel was aware of the operation of anti-conflict laws, whereas public opinion was driven by general sentiments of
distrust towards politics and the political class. Finally, while a majority of interviewees agreed that organisations ought to be accountable, interviews highlighted the dangers of excessive transparency and the inability of organisations to function effectively (in the case of disruptive transparency).

**Conclusion**

The conclusions from the French fieldwork pointed to an unsatisfied citizenry in French democracy, whereby around four in every ten citizens did not feel that any of their governmental institutions could be trusted to best manage the policy issues that matter to them, with trust in the departments and the EU particularly low. There was a deep degree of distrust in the functioning of political institutions and public policies, and a lack of trust in political institutions and politicians. While regions did not appear as central vectors of trust, cities and the national government were vested with a genuine capital as objects of expectations from citizens. Finally, the link between institutional accountability and political trust is weak or unproved. In the survey, the variable ‘trust in government institutions’ has virtually no effect at all on demands for accountability. There does not appear to be a positive association between transparency and trust in government but rather the reverse (Mabillard and Pasquier, 2016).

3. Trust–transparency dynamics in the UK and Germany

I **an Stafford and Dominic Heinz**

*Ian Stafford is a senior lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University and a long-standing member of WISERD. Dominic Heinz is a research assistant on the Trust and Transparency in Multi-Level Governance project.*

The perceived decline of political trust represents one of the key contemporary debates on governance and democracy. Van der Meer (2017) notes that the questions raised within these debates reflect the assumption that given the importance of political trust for the functioning of democracy, the logical conclusion must be that ‘low and declining trust presumably has direct and severe consequences for the quality and stability of representative democracy, its institutions, and its actors.’ These narratives centred on a perceived ‘crisis’ of democracy are frequently underpinned by statistical evidence provided via the surveys, such as the annual Edelman Trust Barometer (Figure 4), and European Values Survey and World Values Survey (Figure 5). In both Figures 4 and 5, the data
appears to suggest at best a stagnation and at worst a serious decline in political trust. However, there are fundamental questions which need to be addressed as to how we can conceptualise and analyse trust, and, if we come to the conclusion that the narratives of the decline in trust are accurate, how we might understand potential remedies.

This short paper focuses on two central questions:

i) How can we characterise the development and role of trust at the sub-national level in Germany and the UK?

ii) What potential role do formal and informal transparency mechanisms play in potentially building trust?

**Figure 4: Trust in government**

![Table showing trust in government](https://www.statista.com/chart/12634/where-trust-in-government-is-highest-and-lowest/)

Before briefly exploring the case studies, it is important to note the contrasting nature of the two case studies. Most notably, one represents an archetypal federal state (Germany) characterised by high levels of both self-rule and shared-rule, whereas the other can be understood as ‘quasi-federal’ with weaker forms of both self-rule and shared-rule (Hooghe et al., 2016). Furthermore, on the one hand, Germany is often characterised as having relatively high levels of political trust, and, on the other, the UK is presented as an example of the decline of political trust. The fieldwork centred on semi-structured interviews with a range of civil society actors at the sub-national level within Germany (Hesse and Saxony-
Anhalt) and the UK (north-west England and Wales – only the latter is reported in this paper).

**Analyzing trust and transparency in the UK**

The territorial governance of the UK is defined both by a high level of asymmetry in terms of the relative devolution of power to its constituent power and by its dynamic nature. The devolved arrangements within both the north-west of England and Wales have evolved significantly over the past 20 years. For example, the devolved settlement within Wales was significantly expanded to encompass full law-making powers following a referendum in 2011, and most recently some borrowing and tax-raising powers have been devolved.

**Figure 5: Political trust in Europe, 2005–2009**

*(World Values Survey & European Values Survey)*

The nature of trust within civil society in the Welsh context varied considerably depending upon the relationships and actors that were being discussed. The high level of accessibility and openness offered by the Welsh government, for example, was seen as facilitating a relatively high degree of trust among civil society actors, although this was characterised as something of a doubled-edge sword. On the one hand, this dynamic was characterised as a significant strength of devolution when compared with the more distant relations between counterparts and Whitehall departments in England, but, on the other hand, there were concerns that relations might become ‘too close’ and ‘cosy’, and that there was risk of ‘groupthink’ and inadequate scrutiny. The trust relations between civil society actors themselves was characterised as somewhat more transactional, with collaboration based on...
an assumption that ‘everyone is in it for the right reasons’, albeit with an awareness of the ‘red-lines’ and limits of different organisations and partners. In general, trust within civil society was characterised as being shaped by a range of different factors including the relatively small scale of Wales and the importance of interpersonal relationships that frequently underpin organisational interactions.

In marked contrast to the general consensus around the shape of trust within the Welsh context, there was greater disagreement around transparency. On the one hand, some civil society actors described having ‘full confidence’ in decision-making and understanding why certain decisions were taken and not others. On the other hand, other actors described decision-making as a ‘black hole’ and too frequently decisions were taken ‘behind closed doors’ or reflected a ‘bunker mentality’. However, there was a degree of agreement that the relative position of actors was key to the transparency of decision-making: for example, transparency was likely to be weaker for the general public and peripheral actors within policy communities. The informal and formal mechanisms for ensuring transparency were also characterised as varying significantly in terms of their effectiveness. Notably, the relatively small size of the media in Wales was identified as a key problem by actors, and more formal mechanisms, such as freedom of information requests, were seen as important but sometimes misused.

**Analysing trust and transparency in Germany**

The German regions are the Länder, which can be understood as state-like structures with most of the institutions of regular states. They reproduce most national-level institutions, with the exception of the federal president. Of course, vernacular regions also exist within the Länder in Germany, like the Baden and Francs within the German Land of Bavaria, but this paper denotes the regions as comprising the Länder themselves in Germany and (for the case of this paper) the two Länder of Hesse and Saxony-Anhalt. The central question addressed in this section is how trust can be established and/or restored. Is trust in the German regions or Länder simply there or not? Are efforts to establish or restore trust superfluous? The role of transparency is particularly important for this question of the establishment of trust. In the German case, which institutional configuration causes more trust or an increase of trust is an open question. Furthermore, it is also an open question whether transparency is the ultimate tool to create or restore trust.

The connection of transparency and trust was observed in the regions of Saxony-Anhalt, in former East Germany, and the economic powerhouse Hesse. The communication drilled down into interviews in relation to which levels of government were most likely to inspire trust. Consistent with findings elsewhere, the municipal level emerged as the most likely to
inspire trust, suggesting that there is a form of proximity trust similar to that observed in other countries. In both the German regions, the main driver for a restoration of trust ought logically to be a strengthening of the municipal structure. Hence, the internal structure of the Land is clearly related to the (re-)establishment of trust in political institutions. In the case of Hesse, the Land showed an institutional continuity, understood as bringing the municipal structure closest to the citizen. From the 1945 onwards in Hesse there has been a stable municipal structure, except for one change at the beginning of the 1970s. In Saxony-Anhalt, on the other hand, there is no such history of institutional continuity. The Land only emerged as an institutional entity during the period of German reunification (1990). In Saxony-Anhalt, since the year 1990, cities and municipalities have shrunk in number and size almost continuously. There has been a demographic and institutional stagnation. In the Hesse Land, in contrast, there is a picture of institutional and demographic dynamism. Hessian cities and municipalities increased in number and size as compared to the size and number of municipalities in Saxony-Anhalt.

These broad historical and institutional factors help to explain the differential levels of institutional trust in the two Länder and, more generally, between the territories of the former Federal Republic of Germany and the five former East German Länder that joined the Federal Republic in 1990. Mistrust and the rise of populist, far-right parties are far more manifest in the former East Germany, notwithstanding the momentous feat of peaceful reunification after 1990. The starting dates of institutional continuity differ between the two regions. Hesse and Saxony-Anhalt are cases for evaluating institutional trust in forms of multi-level governance across all Länder in Germany. These differences between Hesse and Saxony-Anhalt can be seen not only in the number of inhabitants, but also in the number and size of municipalities. The main dynamic in these two German Länder reflects that more generally in Germany: namely, a growth in the dynamic urban areas and a contraction of rural areas. It is an open question how much this relates to trust and transparency.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the case studies highlight the importance of trust and the key point that rather than simply being a case of trust’s presence or absence, we can talk about the potential for building or enhancing trust. In the cases of Hesse and Saxony-Anhalt, there is a clear suggestion that the nature of municipalities and the wider population influences the level of political trust and trust in political institutions. Similarly, in Wales there is a picture of relatively high levels of trust that have been shaped by a wide range of factors, including the scale and design of governance arrangements. It is perhaps less clear what the role of transparency is in acting as an ‘unconditional good’ in terms of facilitating or building trust.
Rather, transparency appears to be a potentially important but not necessarily required trigger for building trust.

4. Trust and transparency in media discourses: Paradoxical representations of the glyphosate controversy

*Lise Jacquez, Isabelle Garcin-Marrou and Simon Gadras*

Lise Jacquez is a postdoctoral researcher in the ELICO research unit; Isabelle Garcin-Marrou is Professor of Media and Communication at Sciences Po Lyon and Director of the ELICO Research Unit; Simon Gadras is senior lecturer in Communication at the University of Lyon 2. Their communication presented interim findings from the Sciences Po Lyon-funded project on Confiance & transparence (co-investigators Alistair Cole and Isabelle Garcin-Marrou).

The communication set out to investigate the role of the media in building networks of trust and transparency in the context of a complex system of governance. Our working hypothesis was that the complexity of governance and crisis in democracy would create a strong demand for explanations, enquiry and contradictory debates among citizens. Journalistic discourse ought to respond to this demand for public controversy on issues of trust and transparency. In order to test this basic hypothesis, the team selected a recent event, which had given rise to controversy over the lack of transparency of decision-making processes: this was the renewal of the authorisation to use glyphosate for five years by the European Union, made on 27 November 2017.

The project involved process-tracing how the media constructed these questions of trust and mistrust in relation to political institutions, the choice of glyphosate being made because of the nature of the issue (highly divisive and likely to engender mistrust) and the multi-level context within which this issue was debated.

*Details of the qualitative media analysis*

The corpus comprised 100 articles or media programmes, published or broadcast between 27 and 29 November 2017, from the written press, online press, the TV and radio. This selection was designed to cover the short time frame during which the event was newsworthy and it represented the discursive moment in its purest form.
The principle of content selection was to ensure a diversity of types of media and of editorial orientation. Content was selected as follows. The written press was represented by four daily national titles, whether in paper or web format:

- **Le Monde**, the leading centre-left quality daily (editorial, as well as three paper and ten web articles)
- **Libération**, another left-of-centre quality daily (editorial, as well as four paper and two web articles)
- **Le Figaro**, the main conservative newspaper (three paper and 14 web articles)
- **Les Echos**, a quality daily paper focusing on economics and business (editorial and seven articles published in identical form in paper and on the web).

Two titles from the quality regional press and one weekly magazine were added:

- **Ouest France**, the mass circulation daily paper based in western France (six paper-based and seven web)
- **La Dépêche du Midi**, a regional paper based in south-eastern France (three articles)
- One quality weekly magazine, **L’Obs** (eight web-based articles).

Television was represented by France 2 (the public station, with eight news items in the main daily news programme and one round-table discussion), France 3 (the main public-sector regional TV channel, with eight reports form the main daily news programme), the website Franceinfo.tv (nine articles), and the main private channel TF1 (two news reports). Finally, the radio was captured by the public channel France Inter (7 September 2017 and the 7 p.m. news programme on 27 November) and the private RTL (three political interviews on the subject, as well as the main news programme).

**The methodology of the media analysis**

Two approaches were adopted. The first was to uncover journalistic styles. The basic hypothesis is that journalistic styles and their enunciate logics (which consist of ‘revealing’ the truth in an apparently neutral style) diffuse conceptions of the trust that ought to be conferred on public authorities and of the transparency of decisions. The prism adopted is that of the role of the media itself as an intermediary between public authorities and the citizens. By identifying the style, the analyst can diagnose the dominant discursive logic and capture the underlying journalistic point of view. There is a long tradition of such investigative journalism in France, particularly with the liberalisation of the media and weakening of central government controls: the 1980s and 1990s were the high-water mark of investigative journalism, which was (already) understood as a means of responding to the crisis of
confidence in institutions and the media. The contemporary version of such a tradition is that of fact-checking.

The second approach consisted of discovering (visual) media representations of political decision-making and levels of governance, and the framing of such processes. The YouGov survey carried out for this project demonstrated that citizens are more prone to trust two levels of government: the city (for proximity-related issues) and the central government (for social protection, equal access to public services, or territorial planning). Two intermediary levels had a thin legitimacy (the regions and departments) and the European Union is absent (weakly identified as an actor even in those areas where it has key responsibilities). The main hypothesis is that Europeanisation produced a relationship that is too distant to accommodate trust, and specifically that the European level does not allow the necessary incarnation of power and authority. On the other hand, there is a clear link between proximity and the legitimacy of decisions.

**The main findings**

- There was an important media coverage of the glyphosate controversy. There were, on average, nine items of news per media outlet during the 27–29 November 2017 period.

- There was a diversity of journalistic styles. These included factual reporting, analysis, enquiry, live coverage, public debates, daily news reports, and confrontation of the different perspectives of the main actors.

- There was also a diversity of the framing tools and the evidence base mobilised. These included discussion of the main issues at stake in the European Council vote (translated into national contexts and challenges); scientific controversies over claims that glyphosate can lead to cancer; the impact on agriculture; the role of lobbies; and the independence of the EU evaluation agencies.

The research uncovered findings in terms of **contrasting editorial lines and approaches**.

First, there was a cluster of newspapers that, using investigative journalism, treated the issue as a scandal. *Le Monde* and *L’Obs* were the most obvious. The key words used were those of ‘scandal’, references to the ‘Monsanto papers’, using ‘confidential sources’ and basic framing in terms of the ‘decade of the manipulation of science’. *Le Monde* specifically challenged the European Food Standards Agency (EFSA). The use of the term ‘scandal’ was a means of framing the issue in a particular way, with problem definition in terms of public health, sanitation and the (scandalous) primacy of economic over health concerns.
However, the other media outlets surveyed did not concentrate on the issue of health or frame the scandal primarily in health terms.

One good example of the health scandal framing was provided by *Le Monde* on 28 November 2017. That day’s editorial set the European Commission and the EU regulatory agencies against the interests of citizens and democracy. The EU decision was described as ‘an imposed decision’. A similar framing occurred in *L’Obs*, which had also published an investigation a few weeks earlier (5 October 2017) in which glyphosate was designated as the ‘worst health scandal of the 21st century’. On 28 November, the journalist Caroline Michel (from the investigative arm of the weekly) commented on a video that described the functioning of the EFSA and the manipulation of scientific data by Monsanto. Her conclusion was that ‘we are really in the situation of the infiltration by powerful interests of these EU regulatory health agencies which are supposed to protect our interests as citizens’. Such a powerful framing was absent from the other outlets. However, interviews with individuals also revealed suspicion of the conflict of interests between the EU Commission and the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, the Green politician Yannick Jadot framed the event in terms of a scandal on France Inter and France 2, as did Michèle Rivasi on RTL and France Info. This discursive position is the one that produced the most virulent criticisms of the EU institutions as being anti-democratic.

The other media outlets did not frame the issue in terms of a health scandal, preferring a more factual interpretation, such as ‘Glyphosate: five more years’ (France 3, 19/20 27 November 2017) or ‘Glyphosate: a new five-year period’ (*Libération*, 28 November 2017). In these sources, the format of the controversy was preferred, either as a confrontation between the main farmer’s union (the FNSEA) and the Ecologists, or in relation to the state of scientific knowledge. These media outlets did not ignore the question of the lack of independence of the expertise available to the EU, but they presented this as one element among others in the debate.

There is also the question of the pedagogical presentation and interpretation present in all the media considered. These were presented either in the question/answer format, or by explanatory videos, but virtually never in terms of the complex institutional questions raised by the issue. For example, there was no explanation as to why the European Parliament did not weigh more heavily in the decision, despite the adoption of a unanimous resolution in favour of abandoning glyphosate in October 2017.

In the press, the dominant trend was that of the question/answer format. For example: ‘what exactly is glyphosate?’, ‘are we really exposed to this?’, ‘why is the credibility of the European agencies of health safety so contested?’, or ‘11 questions to know everything
about Monsanto’s weed killer’. In the radio, TV and online videos, interpretation was shared between interviews (RTL, France Inter, Soir 3) with the same type of questions or debates between journalists and invited guests (Le Figaro web).

**A critical tone towards the process of making European decisions**

Of great interest here, the terms ‘trust’ and ‘mistrust’ were present in 26% of all media content. Quotations from the press displayed a deeply critical tone towards the lack of transparency of EU decision-making procedures. Hence, an editorial in Le Figaro on 27 November 2018 stated: ‘It’s a good job this debate did not take place just before the European elections. It gives a sense of powerlessness and incoherence, a catastrophic image of the functioning of Europe.’¹ A similar sentiment was expressed in Les Echos by European correspondent Derek Perrote, who talked about the ‘European Union’s art of not deciding’ and who opposed the EU to its citizens. The functioning of EU institutions thus appears complex, distant and undemocratic – at least as it is portrayed in media discourse around glyphosate. This observation raises the question of the visibility and forms of incarnation of the different levels of governance in media discourses. One of the most striking conclusions lies in the very substantial differential treatment given to the French state or to the EU. The former is visualised and incarnated as a legitimate form of governance, which is much less the case for the latter.

**Findings: Decision-making processes**

Two levels of governance appear in the media discourses: the EU and the states (represented by France and, to a lesser degree, Germany). In a search of press dossiers of the six months following the 27–29 November 2017 sample date, only five articles cross-tabulated the words ‘regions’ and ‘weed-killers’. The intermediary levels of government were virtually absent from the media discourses. And there was very little difference of treatment between the local and the national media in this respect.

In relation to the EU, there was inconsistent description (revealing a lack of understanding of the complex machinery of the EU) and little knowledge in relation to which level of government ought to be responsible for the glyphosate issue. Sometimes, ‘Europe’ was described in plural terms. The most precise descriptions were those of the journalists in post in Brussels. In Les Echos on 28 November, for example, those charged with the decision were ‘the member states of the European Union’, who decided to renew the license to produce glyphosate for five years. There was also a plural use in the sense that the ‘28

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¹ “Heureusement que ce débat n’a pas lieu avant des élections européennes. Parce que ça donne un sentiment et d’impuissance d’incohérence. […] Je trouve que cela donne une image catastrophique du fonctionnement de l’Europe.” (27 November 2018).
countries could not reach an agreement, but 18 countries said yes’ (France Inter, main news programme at 7 p.m., 27 November). On other occasions, however, Europe is described in singular terms, such as ‘the EU authorises the use of glyphosate for five years’ (Le Figaro, 28 November) or ‘Glyphosate, Europe renews for another five years’ (JT 8 p.m., France 2, 27 November), or the ‘European Commission has decided to serve up glyphosate on our plates for another five years’ (L’Obs, 29 November).

**Findings: Incarnation**

There is no incarnation or ‘us’ in politics in relation to the European level. There is a virtually total absence of incarnation of a European polity, and no emergence of a European political space in the media – except for the Ecologist MEPs, clearly opposed to renewing the glyphosate license, or groups of mobilised citizens in opposition to the plans. On the other hand, President Macron appeared clearly to incarnate a form of resistance at the national level – even though he was unable to prevent this decision.

**Conclusion**

Taking the corpus as a whole, the media acted as important filters of the issue. They were pedagogical about the issues at hand, but they did not even attempt to explain the complexity of the decision-making process. There was a specific framing in terms of a sanitary scandal. There were controversies, but these occurred at the national level. These results confirmed the findings of Baisnée (2003) and Marchetti (2015) on the weak mediatisation of Europe. In addition to the weak incarnation of Europe, the issue highlighted the lack of trust and transparency involved in scientific controversies. There was no general explanation of the issues at stake and the media did not propose the tools for better understanding either the levels of governance and decision-making or the responsibilities of each level.

**5. Europe’s ambivalent transparency**

*Cécile Robert*

*Cécile Robert is a senior lecturer (maîtresse de conférences) at Sciences Po Lyon and a member of the TRIANGLE research laboratory. She has been interested in the question of the transparency of EU policy for around 15 years and presents an overview of her thinking in this presentation, which focuses on transparency between policy instrument and form of discursive legitimisation.*
As a policy instrument, transparency has taken the form of the production and the publication of data on the European institutions – especially the Commission and the Parliament – and their relations with interest groups. Of the various instruments, the European register of policy transparency is the most important (others include the publication of the diaries of EU Commissioners and officials and the legislative process in the Parliament). The approach adopted is in part one of studying transparency through observing these policy instruments. Transparency is an essentially contested concept that is the object of very different understandings by the actors concerned.

Transparency data is presented by the EU institutions as a means of restoring citizenship trust. It is also eagerly analysed by transparency watchdogs, which seek to use the data to provoke scandals and to identify malfunctioning of the EU institutions. Analysis of these socio-technical tools, and the debates that surround their use, aims not only to elucidate their meaning for the actors involved but also to capture the consequences of transparency on their practices. In short, what are the effects of transparency in lobbying and on its place within the EU? This communication explores three complementary dimensions: transparency data and instruments as a way to produce and legitimate particular representations of organised civil society and its role in the EU policy process; the role of transparency mechanisms as a means of incorporating interests (especially the most critical ones) in the decision-making process; and the use of these tools and the data they produce, both as a professional resource for lobbyists and as a tool for advocacy by NGOs.

This communication is concerned with the European policy of transparency, especially the access to documents introduced by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, as well as the need to publicise the names of the beneficiaries of EU grants (the European Transparency Initiative of 2005) and, finally, to publish details of the interactions between politicians and administrative officers, on the one hand, and ‘stakeholders’ (interest groups) on the other.

There are 15 years of data available to map the links between ‘decision-makers’ and representatives of interest groups. There has been a European transparency register since 2008. And various measures contained within the code of good behaviour concern MEPs (2011, 2016), EU civil servants (2013) and Commissioners (2011, 2017). There is also the obligation to make diaries of meetings available for top Commission officials (commissioners, directors of offices [cabinets], directors, directors-general; 2016). There is also a voluntary code concerning the Parliament (2016). Transparency is above all interpreted in terms of online publicity of aspects of the decision-making process.
**Transparency data: Between a governmental instrument and a machine for scandal?**

There are several reasons to be interested in transparency data, not least that of understanding how a policy designed to restore trust and encourage citizen participation has taken the form of a very specific policy in the direction of interest groups, and the co-construction – between the EU and interests – of a ‘stakeholder democracy’. Transparency data collection enrichens a policy instrument approach by using statistics and quantification. It also provides insights into using data sets as part of an activist’s toolkit for mobilisation. Finally, transparency in the academic world promotes a reflexive approach, as the data sets are increasingly used by scholars.

How have transparency tools transformed the conditions for interest groups exercising their influence at the European level? Cécile Robert argues that they had a constructed impact (in relation to the representations of what constitutes ‘organised civil society’ at the EU level) as well as a material impact (the role of interests in the decision-making process and the nature of the relations between EU institutions and groups). Transparency tools have also provided data for activists to challenge the EU institutions themselves (especially in terms of contacts between EU Commissioners and interests).

**Using transparency registers to produce an ‘organised civil society’: Institutional representations and statistical constructions**

The EU has been using the transparency issue to label which groups are legitimate actors who play by the rules, and which fall beyond the pale. Those that are not recognised simply do not exist. The effect of the framing has also been to assimilate all interest groups (and even NGOs, for example) to lobbyists. The particular place occupied by ‘organised civil society’ in the EU is that which the EU institutions determine.

**Transparency tools as resources in negotiations**

The way in which the transparency mechanisms are imagined and produced has an impact on the types of interest that can prosper in the EU. Interests are both ‘observed’ (the objects of transparency) and ‘observers’ (as users of data). There is a battle for influence between commercial interests and not-for-profit NGOs. Interests need to adapt so that they can play the transparency game and go to Brussels to engage in lobbying.

**The example of ALTER-EU: Using data to lobby against corporate interests**

Transparency has given rise to new types of anti-corruption lobby. The Alliance for Lobbying, Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) is a coalition of over 200 public interest
groups and trade unions concerned with the increasing influence exerted by corporate lobbyists on the political agenda in Europe, the resulting loss of democracy in EU decision-making, and the postponement, weakening, or even blockage of urgently needed progress on social, environmental and consumer-protection reforms.

In one of its campaigning pamphlets, ALTER-EU states:

whether it is the proposed EU-US free trade treaty, austerity, internet data privacy, banking, climate change, or almost any other issue, lobbyists are working hard in Brussels and in our capital cities to influence policies and laws. And too many of these lobbyists are working for corporate interests, rather than the public interest.

ALTER-EU advocates that it should be compulsory for all lobbyists to sign-up to a legally binding lobby register:

Improved lobby transparency will help us to know exactly who these lobbyists are, who they work for, how much they spend, and what laws and initiatives they are working on. If they outnumber public interests, lobby transparency will help us expose that, and bring more balance into the debate. If lobbyists are acting unethically or unscrupulously, lobby transparency can help us to reveal that too.

ALTER-EU demands not only that the EU institutions be more transparent, but also that national governments adopt transparent procedures and ways of dealing with lobbies.

There are other lobbies that have arisen because of the transparency agenda. For example, Digital Europe:

The relevance and expertise of stakeholders must be taken into account by the EU institutions as the quality of information is vital to creating legislation that is fit for purpose. As such, we believe that bodies representing collective interests must be recognised as playing a unique role in the policy making process.

For its part, the automobile major Volkswagen accepts that it is necessary to play the transparency game:

Taking into account the rising significance of the Register as a source of information for international media reporting, it appears to be reasonable to establish a group providing advice to the Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, composed of representatives of organisations present in the Register. This could help to achieve the Register’s initial goal in mutual dialogue
and to report in a well-structured way on practical experiences while filling in or using the Register.

**Lobbies, interests and the register**

The existence of the transparency register brings into the open the interactions between individuals (European Commissioners, member of cabinets or civil servants) and named organisations operating in particular sectors. Table 2 summarises this data, which was published on the European Commission’s website from December 2014 to May 2018.

**Table 2: Lobbyists in Brussels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top 11 lobbyists</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Business Europe</td>
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<td>2. Google</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. European Office of Consumers</td>
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<td>4. Airbus</td>
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<td>5. DIGITAL Europe</td>
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<td>6. European Federation of Transport and Environment</td>
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<td>7. Microsoft Corporation</td>
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<td>8. WWF European Policy Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Eurocommerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. European Car-Makers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. American Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Types of lobby organisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(in order of importance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Corporate (2/3rds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. NGOs</td>
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<td>3. Think tanks</td>
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<td>4. Consultants</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Local and regional authorities</td>
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</table>
In an interview with the register's secretariat, in November 2017, an official observed:

> We do not actively monitor profiles of the visitors. We just don’t see what this will tell us. Obviously it’s a public data base, the system is available to be consulted by everyone who is interested in it, but it is also a very specialized tool, it is not a tool that will be used by the man on the street.

The raw data suggests the preponderance of commercial and business interests, whose organisations were able to spend more money and employ more permanent lobbyists than the NGOs, the second cluster of ‘organised civil society’ lobbyists (charities, advocacy groups). Think tanks and consultants came next, followed by local and regional authorities, and churches. The targets of lobbying were members of EU cabinets, senior civil servants (Directors) and the European Commissioners themselves.

**Conclusion – Making data speak: Publics and uses of transparency**

In this fairly closed world, the ‘citizen’ does not really exist; data is the currency of exchange, both as a resource for lobbying and a discursive tool of legitimation. The EU has used the transparency agenda as a means of problem definition – defining what is a legitimate cause of EU concern – and of building its own capacity by bringing the key interests operating within Europe into its own orbit. Two other types of interest have prospered: commercial and business organisations, and those advocacy groups organised around the freedom of information. Citizens, on the other hand, are very remote principles.
PANEL TWO: Trust, Transparency and Third Sector Engagement in Policy-Making

The problematic of trust and transparency is sometimes linked with co-construction. Developing the theme of trust–transparency paradoxes, the papers in this session engaged with questions such as: What are the trade-offs between trust and transparency in policy networks? What are the consequences of ‘process transparency’ for patterns of governance? Has there been an evolution from trust without transparency to the new norm of trust with transparency? The emphasis of each paper is on forms of civil society mobilisation, corresponding in part to the civil society work programme of the WISERD research centre, and in part to work carried out on similar themes in the TRIANGLE research laboratory.

6. Trust, territoriality and third sector engagement in policy-making and welfare provision: Exploring the trust pathologies of welfare pluralism

Paul Chaney and Christala Sophocleous

Paul Chaney is Professor of Social Policy at Cardiff University and one of the co-directors of WISERD. Dr Christala Sophocleous is a Research Associate at Cardiff University. This presentation reported on initial study findings about a new ‘experiment’ in third sector welfare provision in Wales (‘sub-state welfare pluralism’). This comes in the wake of a new law that places a duty on local government to promote the use of voluntary social care service providers (for older people, children, disabled people, vulnerable people, etc.). This new study is exploring the role of trust in the third sector’s developing role in welfare provision. Details of the study can be found here: https://wiserd.ac.uk/research/research-projects/territoriality-and-third-sector-engagement-policy-making-and-welfare.

Lacunae

Our work addresses a number of lacunae. Extant neo-institutionalist work underlines the importance of trust in public institutions. Inter alia, trust is presented in the literature as a key variable in public support for state-organised welfare (Rose, 1991; Rothstein, 1998). Yet, this body of literature fails to take full account of the rise of the mixed economy of welfare as a global phenomenon (Wigell, 2017). Existing studies also fail to take full account of how the manner of welfare pluralism’s development is grounded in the nature of political systems (Wigell, 2017). For example, classic welfare state theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996; Arts
and Gelissen, 2002; Aspalter, 2011) tends to concentrate on state-wide practices, thereby overlooking the (increasing) significance of meso-level developments in the era of devolution/multi-level governance. As Daniele and Geys (2015, p. 3) observe, it is clear that more work is needed on ‘the potential relevance for welfare state support of interpersonal trust among the members of a given community (over and above institutional trust)’. While interpersonal trust has previously been linked to, for instance, economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997), financial development and international trade, its potential significance for welfare state support has thus far been mostly disregarded.

**Context: Declining trust in state-wide government**

Existing studies generally point to ‘sub-national’/meso-government having higher levels of citizen trust than state-wide government. As Henderson et al. (2013, p. 146) note, ‘[citizens] usually have more trust in regional than in national institutions and politicians to pursue and implement “their” interests and therefore want “power” for the region, even if this is of a symbolical or diffuse kind’. Indeed, such was the hope at the outset of devolution in the UK. The then prime minister spoke of ‘a new relationship between government and the people, based on trust, freedom, choice and responsibility … they are concerned with the essence of our democracy and how people can exercise power in our society’ (Blair, 1997, p. 7). Subsequent studies have found that ‘Levels of trust in National Assembly for Wales members [Welsh parliamentarians] appear to have risen, and are now higher than trust in members of UK-level political institutions’ (Scully and Wyn Jones, 2015, p. 515).

**Methodology**

The study undertook 70 in-depth semi-structured interviews with civil society and state policy actors, as well as participant observation of the meetings of civil society organisations (CSOs). Interview transcripts were inductively coded and analysed with NVIVO software. The study also used discourse analysis of policy documents and CSOs’ ‘grey’ literature.

**Social theory**

The study takes as its starting point the tension in the political science literature between descriptive representation (Phillips, 1995; Mansbridge, 1999) and deliberative democracy. The descriptive representation approach emphasises the ‘politics of presence’, whereby representatives, such as a group of parliamentarians, are typical of the public they represent. The deliberative democracy literature emphasises the ‘self-interest’ problem. Here, the argument runs that, if elected representatives are not typical of their constituents, ‘elected representatives will fail to put themselves in the position of those that they are supposed to
represent (empathy), they will not be sufficiently motivated to advance other groups’ causes
and, crucially, they cannot be trusted to do so’ (see Gargarella, 1998). In our study, we were
interested in the extent to which descriptive representation in third sector welfare provision
affected levels of citizen trust and satisfaction. In other words, if welfare providers were
drawn from, and typical of, the communities they served (and were involved in the co-
production of services), would they have greater levels of trust than traditional welfare state
service providers? We were also interested in the levels of trust that politicians and local
government officials had in third sector welfare providers.

**Third sector capability/skills**

The study interviews revealed how trust is shaped by perceptions of CSOs’ capability/skills
and professionalism. CSOs were often viewed as amateur, or at least as less skilled than
statutory sector providers. This aligns with the ABI (ability, benevolence, integrity) framework
and resonates with the critical theory-based approach of Hardy et al. (1998) that focuses on
power relationships and how power masquerades as trust and suborns the less powerful
through control of policy discourse.

For example, a manager with one third sector welfare provider observed:

> I mean I think there is an overarching thing that I feel sometimes in the third
> sector that the statutory bodies don’t trust us enough to be a professional
> organisation. They just think, they have a particular image of volunteers and
> which doesn’t relate to the truth so there is always this perception of inequality –
> and information sharing in itself is complex and difficult but you know we, in lots
> of ways, we’re almost ahead of the game. … I have QCF level 5, health and
> social care [an accredited professional qualification], you know and I could sit in
> a room with people from the local authorities and probably they haven’t.

**Funding regimes**

Interviewees’ comments showed how different state funding regimes of third sector welfare
affected prevailing levels of trust between third sector providers and government. In Wales,
government has moved to fixed-term funding (the ‘sustainable social services’ model), this
funding being instrumentally focused and competitively secured through tendering. It is
structured to ensure delivery of a particular project (in contrast to previous grants that
supported the long-term sustainability of CSOs). Our study found that the new funding
regime forces CSOs into competition, with negative trust outcomes. Interviewees suggested
that the new arrangements undermine the independence of CSOs. They are likened to a form of co-option and thus undermining of trust. As the manager of one CSO told us:

So, for 40 years-odd, [we] had … it was called Section 64 funding. And we were funded as … it was core funding as a national organisation operating in the area of health and social care… I clicked on the email and was totally shocked to … and I suppose devastated, really, to see a letter saying that our application for sustainable social services funding had not been successful, and that was our core funding, which was about two thirds of our funding… [Interviewer: ‘does this make you less trusting?’] … I think it does.

**Government openness: Participation, receptiveness, risk**

Our study also identifies how power asymmetries between statutory welfare providers and civil society welfare providers affect trust. Interviewees questioned the willingness of the statutory (‘professional’) sector and government to engage and co-produce welfare service delivery tenders. Interviewees highlighted how the policy discourse places an emphasis on ‘innovative’ approaches to third sector welfare delivery. However, third sector interviewees questioned government’s willingness to embrace the risk associated with this policy imperative (‘innovation’). For example, one interviewee said: ‘The challenge for the statutory sector is to invite the third sector to the table, listen and understand what they can offer, and engage in long and trusting partnerships to reach mutually desired outcomes for citizens across Wales.’ Another added: 'I think it would be good if the Welsh government could be really brave and adopt more of a co-productive approach.' In theoretical terms, this can be conceptualised as exchange theory and Himmelman’s (1996) notion of collaborative betterment versus collaborative empowerment. Another interviewee summarised the overall situation by saying:

> there has to be, from funders, an appetite for risk in investing in those social enterprises. And I suppose if, you know, I’m immediately then, when I said that, reminded of where we are now. And actually, I don’t think that there’s the trust in the third sector.

**Tendering, marketisation and competition**

Our study found that in Wales the new legislation has seen the emergence of three models of third sector welfare delivery, depending on local government administrative area; in other words, there is geographical variation in how the legislation is applied. Each of the models
involves a significant element of competition for CSOs to secure welfare contracts from government. The three models are:

- **Horizontal/flat/collectivist** – with a diversity of CSOs driving the design and delivery of social welfare
- **A marketised approach** – CSOs are ‘invited’ to compete for contracts. This amounts to the commodification of voluntarism
- **A consortium/risk-transfer model** – the statutory duty is effectively delegated to (large) lead CSOs who commission third sector welfare providers.

A key message that emerged from interviews is that tendering, marketisation and competition act to undermine intra-sectoral trust within the voluntary sector, as well as trust between the sector and government. This raises questions about trust and transparency in policy networks. As one interviewee noted, ‘service deliverers need to trust the umbrella organisations … Being a service deliverer puts you immediately in a place of competition.’

**Openness and accountability in government and regulatory regimes**

This emerged as a key issue in our study interviews. In order to foster greater trust – and following lobbying from third sector organisations and the statutory sector – a citizens’ jury has become a key component in the assessment of third sector welfare. As one interviewee said:

They [citizens’ juries] are often used to demonstrate a commitment to collaboration and consultation where building trust is critical to making decisions supported by the wider public. Evidence suggests, on contentious or controversial matters, citizens’ juries can help to reduce the propensity for conflict and dissention.

According to the policy discourse:

The [citizens' jury] steering group will work with key agencies and individuals to build common purpose and deliver the citizens’ jury in a co-productive and creative way… It will liaise with key organisations including the Welsh government to build a strong, credible and authoritative profile trusted to deliver.

**Governance complexity, accountability and transparency**

Another key finding is that governance complexity is undermining trust, reducing ‘process transparency’ and accountability. As one interviewee put it: ‘If you haven’t got trust, if you haven’t got open dialogue, if you haven’t got interest or understanding of each other’s
positions ... There’s currently a Welsh government-led national steering group but looking at the whole system it’s a really complicated system.’

An indication of the governance complexity can be seen in the large number of institutions involved in the new approach to welfare delivery in Wales. These include public service boards; regional partnership boards; citizens’ panels; local authorities; statutory agencies (health boards, Social Care Wales, etc.); and various forums (social value forums, third sector forums, provider forums).

Such complexity undermines accountability. As one interviewee noted:

In my view, there’s a kind of yawning gap in who’s looking at all this to see if it’s working … I mean delivering for service users … yes, there’s the statutory regulator – but we’re not sure if it’s us [CSO] – or the local authority that they ultimately assess, we’re not sure on how frequently this will be looked at. To be honest, it’s all a bit niwlog [Welsh = ‘foggy’].

**Party political dynamics**

Party political dynamics emerged as a significant factor shaping trust in third sector welfare delivery. In this regard, Wales is exceptional with one-party dominance by the Welsh Labour Party (see Chaney, 2015). As the broad literature suggests, one-party dominance ‘introduces greater uncertainty – whether parliamentarians are genuinely concerned with a given issue or whether they put party interests first’. Trust is a core component influenced by party balance in legislative settings (Dunn, 2011, p. 396; Norris, 1999) and perceptions of the executive party’s political performance (Price and Romantan, 2004). It shapes ‘the regime’s capacity to produce the so-called “procedural goods”’ (Luhiste, 2006, p. 493).

Our study found one-party dominance was creating too much trust for some CSOs. Some of the CSOs we spoke to talked about ‘soft power’ in ‘off-the-record conversations/briefings’, and selected government officials/CSOs giving ‘heads up’ to each other on actions and policy developments. It raises the question: Is the Welsh political system, as a one-party system, being further embedded? Perhaps it is not so much a one-party system but an institutional system made up of the dominant political party and key CSOs who together dominate the field. This view aligns with Grant’s (1978, 1995) insider/outsider concept, according to which trust is undermined for those CSOs on ‘the outside’. As one interviewee said:

there has been a loss of trust in the government … we were naive I suppose… [then] one of our trustees said look at the politics of it! As a party their support
base is mostly urban and in the south of the country … now you can hardly trust
them to put rural interests ahead of that! … no matter what they promised [at the
election].

Government transparency

The policy discourse on the new mixed approach to welfare delivery tends to dissemble by
framing CSO welfare delivery in terms of empowerment, co-production, etc. For example,
‘we are also keen to promote greater partnership working … not only to ensure a stronger
voice for citizens locally, but also to improve efficiency through the sharing and pooling of
capacity’ (Welsh Government, 2018). Yet, there are exceptional examples that are
transparent on the economic imperative (austerity) driving voluntary provision of services.
For example, a key strategy document states:

Welsh Government and the Third Sector recognise the challenges that public
services face. Demand and expectations are increasing, and public funding is
under continuing pressure … We recognise that quality of life cannot be
delivered by the state alone, and we need to capitalise and build on community
action and volunteering, and help communities to be resilient at the local
neighbourhood level. (Welsh Government, 2014, p. 7)

Conclusions

Our emerging findings from the qualitative interviews underline the pivotal role of both
institutional and interpersonal trust in delivering a mixed economy of social welfare.

Coding of the data shows that trust shapes welfare delivery across 12 (non-discrete)
dimensions (Figure 6).
In terms of policy relevance, our interview data show that government (Welsh and local) has failed to understand fully the need to foster trust in order to realise policy goals. The reasons for this include government’s instrumental, incremental, short-term approach to policy driven by economic rationalism (albeit, masked by a participatory/collectivist framing of discourse).

Our data show that failings in trust are multi-directional: there is no simple government versus civil society dyad. We identify a number of trust pathologies of welfare pluralism (Hogwood and Peters, 1985). These relate to a number of factors including party political dynamics, transparency, openness, risk aversion, marketisation, governance complexity, funding regime type, accountability, and regulatory structures.

Our initial findings also point to a paradox. National devolution (the creation of what would become a parliament for Wales in 1999) was predicated on bringing government closer to the people (and, at the level of Wales, there is evidence this has enhanced trust in government). Yet, the views from CSOs suggest that the structural and governance complexity of the new mixed economy of welfare in Wales (marked by a plethora of local and regional boards, partnerships, citizens’ juries, and so on) located even closer to communities has undermined trust owing to complexity, a lack of transparency and a perception of limited accountability.

Christophe Parnet

Christophe Parnet is a PhD student in the TRIANGLE research laboratory. This communication – part of his PhD thesis – is centred on the question: How did the mobilisation of the business community produce a co-construction of the metropolis of Aix-Marseille-Provence? Using semi-structured interviews with members of the political and business community in Aix-Marseille, the communication drills down into the cognitive world of business (section one) and describes the tumultuous relations between business and the local political community (section two). It concludes with the intervention of the central state as an imposed partner, knocking heads together to ensure the emergence of the Aix-Marseille metropolitan council (section three).

The business community in Aix-Marseille is described as a ‘three-legged helix’. The powerful business community exercises influence across three main organisations:

- The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Marseille Provence (with the main business federation, the MEDEF, at the head of the chamber from 2005 to 2018)
- UPE 13: the inter-professional branch of the MEDEF (that is, the various local branches of the employer’s federation MEDEF)
- The Club Top 20, an informal grouping of the most powerful businessmen in the city.

Interviews with the various organisations confirmed that these three business organisations formed a powerful coalition (CCIMP–UPE 13–Top 20) that represented business interests in a coherent manner. In the words of one representative of UPE 13:

Here we have the UPE 13, which derives from the local organisation of the MEDEF and which operates as a powerful group working on behalf of business interests. There is also the Chamber of Commerce, which publishes reports and represents its members in terms of economic development. And the Top 20 is a powerful force lobbying for the interests of big business. In Aix-Marseille, these business organisations all work in the same direction. The advantage with this city is that the world of economic actors is united, though there are other problems with the place.

The powerful business community was used to lobbying hard for its interests. Faced with the divisions of the local political communities, however, business was reduced to adopting a
range of disparate strategies to attempt to impose its views. One of these strategies was to exercise direct and more indirect forms of influence. Another strategy consisted of mobilising expertise and using science to forward the arguments of the metropolis. A final strategy was to engage in a form of protest—although this is one of the classic registers of French politics, it was rather unusual for the business community to operate in this way.

In the first register of informal influence, all strategies were used. One interviewee described the ‘Top 20’ as a club using informal mechanisms of influencing decisions ‘by holding dinner parties, organising meetings between business and politics and briefing the media’. The Top 20 group formed part of a tightly knit business elite. The president of the Club Top 20 was explicit in describing the terms of this influence, which took the form of inviting highly selective guests—for example François Fillon (former premier and LR candidate in 2017), Nathalie Kosciusko Morizet (a conservative politician), or press barons—for informal meetings. These would take the form of dinners, where there would be one principal topic of discussion, such as ‘what is your view of local government reform?’; ‘whither city regions?’ or ‘what is your view of the world today?’ The idea was explicitly one whereby the captains of industry would meet leading politicians to debate the future (expressed in an interview with the former president of the Top 20 group).

A rather different strategy was that of mobilising scientific expertise: Parnet gives the example of the publication *L’archipel Métropolitain* (2009). This was at the initiative of the Chamber of Commerce, supported by UPE 13, the local grouping of MEDEF unions, which commissioned this report written by two experts on questions of territorial development, Yves Cousquer and Jean-Bernard De Cerou.

Finally, business interests engaged in open lobbying of elected politicians, as would any other lobby or interest. They also published pamphlets with a view to influencing public opinion. The example was given in one interview of a critical publication on the lack of a joined-up public transport system because of political divisions within the metropole. This position was justified in interviews by the need to resort to all means of pressure.

*Mistrust towards politicians in the Aix-Marseille city region*

Business leaders distrusted the political class in Marseille, but they recognised the need to cooperate with it. For all the lobbying efforts, it proved impossible to come to an agreement between local business and political interests. From the business perspective, the roots of this mistrust lie in the fact that local politicians defended exclusively their patch and were hostile to the emergence of a metropolitan entity. There were too many local authorities and too many political interests deeply hostile to the emergence of a strengthened metropolis.
around Marseille. From the business perspective, local politicians in the Aix-Marseille area are suspicious of business interests, including those from outside the area (interview), depriving the area of important sources of inward investment and collaboration.

Against the backdrop of mistrust, however, relations converged somewhat in the interests of promoting the candidacy of Marseille Provence as the European City of Culture, which confirms the capacity of core external events to strengthen local growth coalitions. But such harmony was short lived: political conflicts re-emerged shortly after the European City of Culture episode.

**The state as a privileged partner: Technical co-construction of the Aix-Marseille metropolis**

The state moved in to resolve the impasse in Aix-Marseille and smooth over the poor relations between politics and business. Parnet describes how the state mobilised ‘civil society’ as an arm to overcome domestic resistance to creating a metropolitan city authority. This came after local politicians steadfastly refused the plans of the state to introduce a metropolitan authority. Business interests were in the forefront of the civil society actors encouraged by the state to manifest their support in favour of the unified metropolitan authority.

The opposition of local councils to merging into an overarching metropolitan authority was easily understood. The decision to create an inter-ministerial mission to plan for the new authority was made by a government decree, specifically by the Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault. This mission included representatives of the main local governments in the area – notably the six intercommunal corporations (*Etablissement public de cooperation intercommunal* – EPCI), represented by their presidents. These public bodies were all destined to disappear, however. Along with the six EPCI, the committee consisted of the mayor of Marseille, the president of the departmental council and the president of the regional council. But this committee met on only one occasion. Alongside this mission, a Partnership Council was created by the state, which sought to associate all interested civil society actors by inviting them to participate in reflection on the nature of the new metropolitan authority. The Partnership Council was highly active and mobilised up to 1,200 civil society actors. Business actors performed a key role in the Partnership Council, with the Chamber of Commerce leading the pro-metropolis coalition. The Partnership Council brought civil society and business actors into contact with representatives of the state, notably the prefect and his services. The Club Top 20 was heavily involved in facilitating discussions (interviews).
In conclusion, the Aix-Marseille case study demonstrates, in a rather paradoxical way, that mistrust can be a driver for forming closer relationships: the configuration was one whereby the converging interests of the local business sector and the French state outweighed the forces of resistance in the city region’s local authorities. But at what price? Only time will tell whether a cohesive metropolis can be built in the context of such a weak metropolitan capacity.

8. The role of political alienation in the UK’s Brexit vote

Stuart Fox

Stuart Fox is a quantitative research associate at the Wales Institute for Social & Economic Research, Data & Methods, Cardiff University. In his presentation, he communicated findings of a survey of the 2017 UK general election in which the question of political alienation was to the forefront. Looking back at the Brexit referendum in the UK, Fox cast doubt on the prevailing interpretation of the Brexit referendum as a manifestation of political alienation.

A common interpretation of the UK’s Brexit vote is that it was a rejection of an out-of-touch political elite, or a failing political and economic system, by the politically alienated majority of British voters. The Brexit vote is often associated by journalists and even academics as the angry backlash of a politically alienated populace. Journalists link support for Brexit with voters’ estrangement from the political system or the failures of politicians, and they have compared Brexit with other trends related to alienation: for example, support for US president Donald Trump, the French Front National or the Italian Five Star Movement. Academic studies link factors such as economic deprivation with anger at the political system and support for Brexit (Curtice, 2017; Clarke et al., 2017). Among practitioners, the Labour and Conservative 2017 general election campaigns saw Brexit as an ‘anti-establishment vote’. Both campaigns in the 2016 referendum reinforced this impression: for the Leave campaign, former minister Michael Gove complained that ‘people in this country have had enough of experts’, while the Britain Stronger in Europe organisation supporting Remain urged against leaving the EU because it would be a ‘leap in the dark’.

Such accounts rely, however, on assumptions that certain political attitudes or opinions (such as being opposed to immigration from EU Member States) lead to politically alienated voters who feel that supporting Brexit is the only way to express their estrangement. These assumptions fail directly to measure traits associated with political alienation. Using a model
of political alienation developed in previous research, based around perceptions of political trust (defined here in terms of voters’ trust in the integrity of politicians) and efficacy (which refers to voters’ faith in the responsiveness of the political system or elite to their efforts to influence it, and their confidence in their ability to do so), Fox’s study directly examines the effect of feeling politically alienated on support for Brexit, and considers the role that a lack of political trust and efficacy played in taking the UK out of the EU. Contrary to many accounts, the study shows that political alienation played a marginal role in building support for Brexit. While there is evidence that lower political trust and efficacy increased the chance of voting ‘Leave’ in the referendum, the impact of this effect was minimal. This is primarily because the difference in political trust and efficacy between pro- and anti-Brexit voters was negligible – neither group could be described as having a particularly positive view of the British political system. The common assumption that Brexit was the cry of the politically alienated, therefore, is undermined primarily because it failed to appreciate how politically alienated people opposed to Brexit were as well.

Fox argues that the orthodox accounts do not represent direct tests of the relationship between political alienation and Brexit. There is an assumption that factors such as economic deprivation produce alienation and that this was likely to manifest itself in a pro-Brexit vote. But there are a number of observations that contest such an easy relationship. Is it possible to be economically deprived and hostile to migrants, but not to consider oneself alienated from the political system? There ought at least to be a theoretical possibility of this. Is it possible to oppose or support Brexit and not feel alienated? This ought also to be theoretically possible; there were positive reasons for supporting either remaining in the EU (‘pool, magnify sovereignty’), or quitting the organisation (‘recover sovereignty’). Most tellingly, is it really only around 52% of British citizens who feel estranged from the political system? Fox argues that alienation could not be considered to be decisive for the Brexit vote – not least because most ‘Remain’ voters feel alienated from politics as well! At the end of a sophisticated logistical regression analysis, Fox calculated that only around one in four voters were more likely to vote for Brexit because of a feeling of alienation. Having said this, low political trust was the vital characteristic of this group.

Political alienation represents more than a simple lack of interest; it signifies an outright feeling of rejection of the political system. Fox defined political alienation as a relatively stable attitude reflecting lasting estrangement from the political system or community. He identified three core features: powerlessness (the elite, the system is unresponsive to citizens’ influence), which produces a low level of external efficacy (the belief in the ability to influence the system); meaninglessness (the political process is just too complex to engage with), which produces a low level of internal efficacy; and normlessness (the norms of just
interaction and conduct can no longer be adhered to, because of a collapse in political trust). These three dimensions are considered as separate indicators of political alienation. They were captured by distinct questions in the 2017 survey:

- Powerlessness was measured by the statement: ‘Politicians don’t care what people like me think’
- Meaninglessness was captured by the statement: ‘Politics can seem so complicated it’s hard to understand’
- Normlessness was interpreted by the statement ‘Politicians can’t be trusted to put the needs of the country first’.

This third indicator placed the most importance on lack of trust, which is of key interest here. There is certainly a trust dimension to alienation. There is low trust in the integrity of politicians, in the competence of government and belief in its willingness to do ‘the right thing’. There is suspicion of the intentions of government. These traits are all connected with political normlessness, itself associated with a desire to take remedial action, by actions such as voting for Brexit. But lack of trust might also conceivably express itself by supporting lower and higher levels of government, rather than the central government as the main object of a lack of trustworthiness.

In the data and analysis section, Fox tested these presuppositions on the basis of data collected by a YouGov survey in the UK 2017 general election commissioned by WISERD. The survey included data on the 2016 referendum vote choice. It measured all three dimensions of alienation by way of separate survey questions. Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the three statements were classified as being politically alienated.
Figure 7: Political alienation in Britain

Figure 7 demonstrates that political alienation is widespread in Britain, with more than 80% of voters demonstrating one of the three core characteristics. Of the three positions, however, one – normlessness – actually produced more support for Remain in the 2016 referendum, though there was a stronger relationship between powerlessness and meaninglessness and the pro-Brexit vote (see Figure 8). At the very least, these findings challenge easy correlations between political alienation and Brexit.

Figure 8: Alienation and vote choice in the EU referendum

To drill down further into causalities, logistic regression analysis then estimated the effect of alienation on the Brexit vote, while controlling for traits associated with Brexit and turnout (mainly age, ethnicity, interest and education). Findings are presented in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Predicted probability of supporting Brexit

Source: YouGov.

**Note:** Predicted probabilities calculated following logistic regression analysis using Stata 14. The regression models included controls for age, gender, education, ethnicity, interest in politics, party identification, national identity, newspaper readership, political ideology and region. * – effect (relative to that of ‘not alienated’ group) statistically significant to at least 95% confidence level.

Was Brexit caused by political alienation? Fox is rather sceptical of the claim. Certainly, one in three of those voting for Brexit could be classified as politically alienated, but this qualification would also apply to almost one in four of those voting Remain. For these alienated voters, low political trust and low external efficacy (in other words, a lack of trust in politicians coupled with a lack of faith that they can be held to account through the political process) increased support for Brexit. The lack of trust in the integrity of the political elite (who backed Remain) was central to this vote. But for a majority of voters of Leave and Remain, causes need to go beyond political alienation. There is clear evidence to support the view that political alienation had only a marginal impact on the Brexit vote, especially the fact that the traits of political alienation were shared between pro- and anti-Brexit voters. The claim that Brexit was a reflection of political alienation was true for a minority, but it underestimates the alienation of Remain voters and the underlying state of disconnect with the British political system as a whole.
9. Restructuring the state: Mid-level bureaucrats between loss of autonomy and empowerment

Julien Barrier and Olivier Quéré

Julien Barrier is a lecturer (maître de conférences) at the École normale supérieure, based in Lyon. Olivier Quéré is a postdoctoral researcher based in the TRIANGLE.

In their communication, Barrier and Quéré discussed state restructuring and public service reform in France, with a particular emphasis on the role of transparency. The object of analysis is that of the intermediary cadres of the French civil service. How have these middle-level officials coped with an important effort of state restructuring over the past three decades? By studying middle managers of the French civil service, Barrier and Quéré focused on the managerial transformation of the French state. This transformation has taken the form of changes in the working conditions of civil servants and their evaluation (Jeannot, 2008; Alber, 2011); important modifications in the organisational structures of the state services (Poupeau, 2013); more horizontal forms of management across administrative hierarchies (Bezes, 2005); and the introduction of new tools, such as performance indicators, budgetary reform and enhanced transparency. As a result of three decades of legislative and regulatory activism, the reform of the state has emerged as a reform field in its own right, in France as elsewhere (Bezes, 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Of great pertinence to the problématique of the colloquium, the objective of these reforms has been to strengthen efficiency by promoting greater transparency and increasing the steering capacity of the central administration (Pollitt, 1990; Hood, 1991).

This project situated itself in a long tradition of studying street-level bureaucrats. What forms of autonomy and professional independence are experienced by agents in direct contact with the public? Existing studies have especially encompassed the role of agents in direct contact with the public (‘agents de guichet’: Dubois, 2010; Bezes and Demazière, 2011) and those engaged in unconventional jobs with ill-defined expectations (‘métiers flous’: Jeannot, 2005). Alongside these middle-level bureaucrats, there has been an important politisation of top civil servants, who have assumed a more important role as the process of state reform has become embedded over recent decades (Eymeri, 2001).

The empirical research drilled down into a sample of middle-level officials and their experience of these reforms. Full details are contained in the special issue of the French review, Revue française d’administration publique, co-edited by the two authors (Barrier and Quéré). The intermediary echelons of the civil service provide a pertinent cadre to understand the impact of transformations on working practices. The category ‘intermediary
civil servant’ is a blurred one. Traditionally, mid-ranking bureaucrats lie somewhere between the street-level bureaucrats studied by Lipsky (1980) and the elite civil servants. They have been described in terms of public service cadres (Gadéa, 2003; Bouffartigues et al., 2010) and attempts have been made to understand this group in historical terms. The category is a highly relevant one, however, as it allows the analyst to capture the new professions emerging within the public service, such as in the field of risk management in the health sector (Ferlie et al., 1996; Farrell and Morris, 2003). The focus on the middle level also allows us to capture the rising importance of tougher management of resources (Deem et al., 2007).

The empirical work focused on middle managers working in a situation of tension. These middle managers are vested with responsibility for administering the new managerial tools in their organisation or service/division (Currie, 2000). The survey undertaken (published in full under Barrier and Quéré, 2016) identified a considerable intensification of the workload (McCann et al., 2008). These middle managers were subjected to pressures from their hierarchical superiors, as well as from employees they line-managed (Currie and Procter, 2005; McConville, 2006). Consequently, middle management became the target of criticisms from all sides.

There are various conceptual entry points into studying middle managers. The most common is focusing on activities or working positions. Floyd and Woolridge talk of the actors of transparency as occupying a hierarchical position within the organisation, observing and monitoring the behaviour of officials under their charge. In a similar register, new horizontal actors are there to ensure that decisions taken are not only implemented, but also joined up across the organisation (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Rouleau, 2005; Balogun and Rouleau, 2011) All in all, these actors occupy a range of positions within the organisation (Lipsky 1980). The tensions lie in the ambivalence in relation to their position: Are they supervisors? Intermediary leaders? Line managers with specific monitoring and accountability tasks? They can be all of these. There is a tension between the leadership vocation of these middle managers and their practical closure within fairly rigid bureaucratic systems. These actors are caught between hybrid logics; in practice, their autonomy is limited, as they must comply with new forms of hierarchy within their administrations. In this context of limited autonomy, middle managers need to construct their own places within the organisation. For the purposes of this conference, the key point is that their power and influence lie in their ability to interpret transparency, to act as an interface between top-down and bottom-up forms of transparency and to distribute resources in terms of more or less transparent performance criteria. While such relationships can undermine traditional understandings of trust within
organisations, transparency can empower the middle managers on whom is conferred the responsibility for monitoring new managerial tools.

**PANEL THREE: Resilience, Trust and Transparency in Knowledge, Innovation and Education**

Drawing on a long tradition of comparative studies, the contributions in the third session explored the changing frontiers of the state and civil society, and they addressed core questions such as: How resilient are relationships in the field of education? What sort of policy instruments are transparency and accountability in the field of education? Are there recognisable trust–transparency trade-offs in patterns of educational governance?

10. The changing frontiers of the state and civil society in education: A comparative analysis of France and Wales

*Sally Power and Chris Taylor*

*Daniel Frandji and Philippe Vitale*

Sally Power and Chris Taylor are both professors in the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University and members of WISERD Education. Sally Power is a co-director of WISERD. Daniel Frandji is a member of the TRIANGLE laboratory, while Philippe Vitale is a member of the Aix-en-Provence-based LAMES laboratory (Laboratoire méditerranéen de sociologie – UMR 7305).

In many countries, and in the UK in particular, there has been an increasing ‘de-statification’ of education. Most research has focused on marketisation and privatisation, but relatively little research has focused on the growing involvement of the voluntary sector in education and what this might mean for young people’s current and future engagement in civil society.

France and the UK provide two important contexts in which to explore these issues, as they differ in terms of the relationship between the state, the education system and civil society (Green, 1990). This difference can be traced back to the contrasting development of their education systems. France’s highly centralised education system was put in place much earlier than was the UK’s education system, and the French system was geared to nation-state building. By contrast, throughout most of the nineteenth century it is difficult to speak of an education system in the UK at all, either in terms of centrally organised provision or a national remit. Education was largely provided by the voluntary sector and private schools. The legacy of this remains: over one in five state-funded schools are still controlled by either
the Roman Catholic Church or the Anglican Church. And such state control as developed during the twentieth century is now gradually being reduced.

Again, the same contrasting traditions of liberalism and state control can be seen in the patterns of voluntary activity and membership. For example, two different analyses (Anheier and Salamon, 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001) explain the comparative rates of volunteering in terms of the different cultural repertoires of countries. In both studies, Britain’s relatively high levels of volunteering are seen to be related to a liberal third sector that stimulates voluntary sector activity and participation. In both, France’s more statist approach leads to a voluntary sector that is less pronounced.

It is against this contrasting political and historical background that we sought to examine young people’s engagement with civil society in Wales and France, whether they place greater trust in the voluntary sector or the state, and what the implications of increasing voluntary sector involvement in education might mean for their future relationship with civil society.

The research

The data derive from two questionnaire surveys that involved nearly 1,000 young people in south Wales and over 200 young people in Lyon. There are some differences in the samples – our French respondents are slightly older than our Welsh respondents – with a modal age of 15 and 14 years respectively. Our French students are also more socio-economically advantaged than our Welsh students. While this means that we need to treat the data with some caution, the differences between the two groups are very strong and are unlikely to be accounted for by sampling issues alone.

The findings

What differences are there in these young people’s engagement in civil society?

There are striking differences in both the extent and nature of young people’s engagement in civil society. Our Welsh respondents report far higher levels of ‘charitable’ activity – in terms of donating money, fundraising and volunteering. For example, nearly three quarters of French students had undertaken no volunteering in the previous 12 months, whereas this was the case for only 40% of our Welsh respondents.

The French students, on the other hand, report far higher levels of what might be considered ‘political’ activity – in terms of campaigns, petitioning and demonstrating – than the Welsh students. The French students are five times more likely to have participated in a political
rally, five times more likely to have joined a demonstration, and three times more likely to have signed a petition.

The differences between the two cohorts are clearly manifest in their membership of non-school clubs and organisations. Our Welsh students are twice as likely to be members of organisations, such as the Scouts or Guides, while our French students are three times more likely to be members of environmental organisations, and five times more likely to be members of political and rights-focused organisations.

*What are their respective levels of confidence in the state or the voluntary sector to meet social needs?*

The findings here are more complex. In spite of their higher levels of engagement with charities, or perhaps because of this, our Welsh students are less positive about charities in general than their French counterparts. One third of our Welsh students agree with the statement that ‘charities are nothing more than big businesses’, whereas well over half of our French students disagree with that claim.

However, our Welsh students are equally negative about the capacity of the state to address social problems. Over half of them agree with the statement that ‘charities are better than governments at responding to people’s needs’. And they are also far more likely (46% as opposed to 31%) to agree with the statement that ‘if the government did its job properly, we wouldn’t need charities’. Our French students are more positive about charities in general, but do not agree that they are better than the state at meeting social needs.

*What are the implications for increasing voluntary sector activity in education for young people’s future engagement in civil society?*

Clearly, responses to this question can only be highly speculative. Nevertheless, on the basis of the data from Wales, it would appear that the greater involvement of the voluntary sector in education does not necessarily lead to greater levels of civic engagement. Indeed, it might be argued that it not only reflects but also reinforces a disillusionment with political engagement. There must also be concerns about the sustainability of our Welsh students’ engagement with charities. While they may well be involved in all kinds of activities while at school, they are more cynical about volunteering than our French students. For example, they are more likely to agree than disagree with the statement that ‘volunteering is a way of the government making people work for nothing’. They are also less likely than our French students to say that they got involved in charitable activities in order to ‘improve things or help people’.
Conclusion

This exploratory investigation underscores that there are still strong differences between the UK (in this case, Wales) and France in young people’s levels and types of civic engagement and their confidence in the state and the voluntary sector. These differences have their roots in contrasting traditions of the state and the voluntary sector involvement in education. It may be that these differences are being eroded as levels of voluntary sector activity increase in France. If this is the case, it may well mean that levels of charitable engagement increase as political engagement decreases. The implications of school-fostered engagement with the voluntary sector may not, though, lead to longer-term civic engagement.

11. Education, cities and partnerships in France and England

Renaud Morel

Renaud Morel is a doctoral student working in the TRIANGLE laboratory. He engages in this communication with the interplay between trust and transparency in the field of comparative education.

The main questions underpinning this communication are comparative ones: How and why has there emerged a form of questioning in relation to the trust and transparency of educational policies? How and why has the question of trust become such an important question in education, to the extent of crowding out other equally pertinent questions? And why was trust not an issue in previous debates on education? The argument presented here is that these comparative understandings of trust are intricately linked to those of territory and centre–periphery relations. They are deeply contextual and need to be understood in this context. The aim of the paper is to link trust and territory: What do broad territorial configurations tell us about styles of trust? The communication is organised in three parts that correspond to three types of territorialisation.

The historical model and the first phase of territorialisation in the nineteenth century

There was a primary form of territorialisation in the nineteenth century in England, France and Spain, the three countries of analysis. In each country, the local level was important for educational policy and planning. States in the nineteenth century were limited to a few core functions, and local services were first delivered on a local level. Welfare states only emerged at a later date in the twentieth century. The case has been extensively discussed in relation to England and France. The most interesting case here is that of Spain. From the
early nineteenth century, the Spanish central state relied on municipalities to deliver educational services, but this had nothing to do with trust and transparency. Indeed, the local level was rife with clientelism and corruption. But the central state was a weak construction and had no alternative. The Spanish case demonstrates that there is no particular link between trust and territory.

**The French case: Linking trust and transparency in the delivery of educational services**

How did these notions of trust and transparency appear in the French education debate? The answer lies in the development of a second type of territorialisation that might be labelled as urban governance, from the 1980s onwards. For a long time, territory had been an important frame for the definition of public problems and policies. In a seminal article in 1996, Duran and Thoenig described the end of the model of territorial integration that had been prevalent until the 1970s, the model known as that of cross-regulation. This model had three important characteristics: it was a hierarchical model, in which the state is central; it was a sectoral model, functioning on the basis of the main ministries; and it favoured technical expertise, as vested in the *grands corps* (the highest grades in the civil service). Though this model was adapted to post-war modernisation, it was not suited to the changing challenges of the post-welfare period of the 1970s onwards. Societies’ problems had become much more complex. And public policies could no longer be conceived in purely sectoral terms, but were horizontal and cross-cutting, requiring horizontal inter-organisational solutions. Territory provided a new way of appreciating the wicked challenges of contemporary public policy. Here, a new territorial model emerged, opposite in most respects to the older model of cross-regulation. In this new model, a new methodological approach was invented: that of governing by project. Three main tools were used in this new territorial approach: diagnostics, inter-organisational horizontal networking, and territorially specific expertise. In this new form of public policy, the state is only one actor among many, operating within the context of new forms of institutionalisation.

The role of trust emerges as part of this new modus operandi. Inter-organisational relations require trust, or at least acceptance of common codes of behaviour and shared values and ways of understanding the world. Institutional cultures develop to allow such inter-organisational cohesion and cooperation. But the new games are complex ones. The various mechanisms of inter-organisational cooperation are often complex and difficult for outsiders to understand. They lack transparency.

These notions of trust and transparency are emerging ones in the French case. They appear to respond to the general logic of the evolution of the centre–periphery system.
Trust, transparency and neo-liberalism in the United Kingdom

In the UK, there was a reverse movement in the history of centre–periphery relations: from locally based services to centralisation. But the same notions of trust and transparency gradually worked their way into policy discourse, albeit vested with a different meaning. How can this reverse movement be explained? There was traditionally an informal consensus in the country about the roles of the schools, the local education authorities and the state, developed in the immediate post-war period. This consensus was called into question from the 1980s onwards and the return to power of the Conservatives in 1979. There were three concomitant movements: a recentralisation of the school system, a weakening of local authorities, and an increase in the local autonomy of schools (the self-governing of schools). These three were each present in the 1988 Education Act.

In relation to transparency, Breuillard and Cole (2000) demonstrated that the Conservatives engaged very early on in an ideological crusade against waste and the inefficiency of public policy in the field of education. Transparency was a means of breaking open a closed network dominated by the public sector. This configuration was not the same as in France; notions of trust and transparency were directly influenced by Conservative politicians. Transparency is also a tool in the hands of parents to be able to compare school performance, and thus make the right choices for their children. Several measures strengthened the role of parents in the 1980s, and these have continued.

Hence, in the case of England, we observe a paradoxical recentralisation, implemented by independent regulatory agencies (such as the Office of Standards in Education – OFSTED) and based on new public management principles. The Conservative period coincided with an under-investment in public services. Tony Blair was elected based on a new deal: reinvestment in public services, but a demand for accountability with respect to key performance indicators (KPIs). The KPIs had as an objective not only to increase the efficiency of services, but also to justify the public expenditure involved.

Conclusion

The key problem, illustrated in the case of education in England, is as follows: when transparency becomes a form of permanent control, trust evaporates. Moreover, the tools required to enhance transparency have a negative impact on the trust required to deliver services on an inter-organisational basis. In the case of the UK, transparency has held the upper hand, framing a specific understanding of trust. The case suggests that too much transparency can undermine trust.
12. Accountable and/or responsible? School accountability and its forum: elements from a France–Quebec comparison

Hélène Buisson-Fenet

Hélène Buisson-Fenet is a senior CNRS researcher at the École normale supérieure in Lyon and a member of the TRIANGLE laboratory. She is an expert in education policy and practice. In this communication, she addresses the issue of school accountability in a comparative context, based on a comparison between France and Quebec. The central argument is that transparency needs to be framed in terms of accountability relationships, which are best captured by agent–forum relations and which depend on (among other factors) the nature of the forum (Bovens, 2010).

There are several understandings of school accountability:

As a policy goal, it involves improving the effectiveness and efficiency of educational systems through the introduction of mechanisms encouraging or forcing actors to provide evidence of the results of their actions. Typically, this involves performing actions that can link the institutional environment and classroom practice (see, for example, Broadfoot, 1996; Carnoy and Loeb, 2002). In this framing, public trust ought to be considered as a virtue, a moral principle that justifies the accountability goal. It is used primarily as a normative concept, as a standard for the evaluation of the satisfaction of the stakeholders. Trust-building is the opposite of blame-avoiding: in relation to school policies, it refers to parental concerns and the embedding of school choice as a principle of autonomy.

School accountability can also be understood as a sociological object: an ongoing process of mediating a social–professional relationship (Bovens, 2007). In this understanding, accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor is obliged to explain and justify his or her conduct. The forum can ask questions and pass judgement and the actor may face the consequences of his or her actions.

Public transparency is thus a possible mechanism to link the actor and the forum. It refers to the accountability of the actor to various audiences, especially to institutional authorities, school users (particularly families) and professional communities (such as teaching unions and professional accreditation bodies).

The communication presented findings from the comparative project on school accountability in France and Quebec, with which Hélène Buisson-Fenet was involved. The project was conducting a sociological analysis of the origins, the instruments and the interactions mediating school accountability policies in France and in Canada (Quebec).
The case selection was that of a most different design: it concerned accountability policy in two school systems which are strongly varied. For the purposes of the comparison, school accountability was defined through four types of managerial tools: school (pedagogical) projects, outcomes-based school contracts, evaluation processes, and financial and budgeting instruments. The empirical investigation involved a multi-level analysis based on the case studies of three French academies (the regional field service of the education ministry in Créteil, Versailles and Lyon) and nine lycées, the upper-secondary schools (six state comprehensive high schools, and three private high schools). In Quebec, the sample included three school districts and four school boards. The comparison here mainly involves two of these regions: the Lyon Academy and the Montreal school board.

**Accountability in the Lyon Academy**

At the national level, there is a results-based form of steering (measuring academies by the performance of their schools in the baccalaureate). There is a strongly path-dependent way of conceiving accountability and regulating the national school system. There are elements of performance accountability: these have taken the form of performance-oriented guidelines for headteachers (from 2008). Schools also need to provide a mission statement (based on goals over a four-year period). Other forms of evaluation include contractualisation with the regional authorities and a yearly ‘administrative dialogue’ with the rectorate, the state’s educational field service in the regions. But accountability does not really filter down into the performance of the teaching profession or educational professionals.

Schools are evaluated by the French education ministry in relation to their performance. There are five main school accountability tools: a school diagnosis based on indicators of school performance; a yearly performance report; a formal letter setting out objectives for the year ahead; a school teaching and learning project; and an outcomes-based contract. How do these indicators play themselves out in terms of individual schools? In the case of the Lyon Academy, for example, the survey included four upper-secondary schools: three state schools and one private school.

- The main accountability indicator is that of performance in the baccalaureate: scores ranged from 100% in the most favoured state school and the private school, to a low of only 78% in the most unfavoured secondary school.
- Figures for the proportion of an age cohort succeeding the baccalaureate (i.e., the proportion including those pupils who do not sit the baccalaureate) revealed more substantial differences: only 54% of the private school cohort in the sample attained.
the baccalaureate, whereas the proportion in the public schools varied from 52% to 100%.

- Other indicators included the proportion of pupils repeating their school year, which followed a similar path (from 9.4% in the public schools to 18.4% in the private school).

- Finally, each school published a self-evaluation of the main challenges they faced (in the four-year plan). These ranged from competition with private schools, reducing the rate of pupil resits, ensuring a fuller integration of those with learning difficulties, and improving school academic performance.

Overall, the model of school accountability remains a traditional one, based on respecting formal rules and valuing self-evaluation. Unlike in England, for example, it is inconceivable that schools be closed merely based on their performance (rather than on demographic factors).

In the case of Montreal (and Quebec), the Montreal school district operates within a national context. There have been several measures of school accountability introduced over the years, with federal Acts in 2000, 2002 and 2008. These have included: contractual tools (partnership agreements between ministry and school boards, management and educational success agreements between schools and school boards); a form of compulsory accountability based on transferring school results to the ministerial hierarchy; and a less formal statement of expectations to the public served by the schools and school boards. This is a system of low stakes, however. There are no real sanctions or penalties from the ministry, and a variable mix of support is provided for, and sanctions imposed on, schools by the school board. Research uncovered evidence of the local peculiarities of results-based management. There was a system of supporting school staff (through professional learning communities), an extensive statistical toolbox and a broad use of data, with the aim of meeting targets and focusing on the improvement of pupil results over time.

In the specific case of the school boards observed, statistics were gathered in relation to territory, social background, demographics, completion rates and the main challenges facing schools. The four school boards were selected in order to capture a mix of rural, suburban and urban contexts and were weighted in terms of their sociological composition (homogeneous community, diverse community, socially advantaged, mixed). Completion rates were presented in terms of descriptive statistics, with no value-added dimension. The main challenges were those formulated by the school boards themselves: each one of the school boards identified competition with private schools as being a major challenge. Academic performance was a concern for three of the four school boards. The least
favoured school also identified the integration of students with learning difficulties and the linguistic integration of immigrants as major challenges, while the most favoured school board complained of the ‘stagnation’ of success rates, described as ‘unacceptable’.

**Theoretical framework**

These findings were interpreted by a theoretical model developed by Malen (2006). Schools re-shape the content and orientations of policy in specific ‘logics of action’, so that they **dissolve or assimilate** and **cancel or amplify** the reforms.

Two sets of factors enter into play: first, the institutional context (the normative and cognitive frames, the ethos and organisation prevailing in the school); second, the strategies and games played at the school level, or the micropolitics. The ‘micropolitics’ perspective puts forward agency inside the organisations. It describes the ‘political culture’ of a school, which accounts for both stability and change in school settings. Three main dimensions are used to operationalise the concept of the ‘logic of action’: the role of policy instruments within the school organisation; the school organisation’s coordination mechanisms; and the process of change or of path-dependency in the broader system.

Following from Malen’s typology, Buisson-Fenet presents schools and school districts as ‘loosely coupled’ organisations. Taking the simple couples developed by Malen (do school actors **dissolve or assimilate** and **cancel or amplify** the reforms?), the communication then compared forms of school accountability in Montreal and Lyon.

In Quebec, the links to school users came from the school boards, the middle-level authorities, rather than schools as organisations. There was a process of assimilation and amplification, as actors embraced the changes introduced at the federal level. The full range of tools introduced in legislation were operationalised, and there was also a significant development of coordination mechanisms, using self-monitoring tools. Though the process varied across school boards, it represented a major transformation. There was a mix of vertical mechanisms of contractualisation between schools and the school board, and local mechanisms of accountability within and between schools. These developments were possible because they were framed in a narrative of the importance of preserving school democracy, and of sharing the objective of success for all. The Quebec example is one whereby evaluation tools provide new knowledge on schools, which is shared locally with school-user councils (since the 2014 reform). If the results are published, schools are not ranked and there are no real penalties for poor performance.
Table 3: Educational accountability in France and Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional dimension of accountability process</th>
<th>Professional dimension of accountability process</th>
<th>Cognitive dimension of accountability process</th>
<th>Main actor of the ‘forum’</th>
<th>Main moral norm of accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Numerous official texts on school evaluation</td>
<td>Uncertain changes of the professional identities of evaluators</td>
<td>Low knowledge of research findings</td>
<td>Pedagogical hierarchy (inspectors)</td>
<td>Public trust towards teachers’ expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal result-based tools</td>
<td>Various professional oppositions to accountability</td>
<td>Variability of the conception of accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting implementation of evaluation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Quebec</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quebec</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quebec</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quebec</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quebec</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Education Bills</td>
<td>Enlargement of professional roles and identities</td>
<td>Pragmatic conception of ‘the good school’</td>
<td>School councils and their users</td>
<td>Transparency of schools’ (and even classes’) performances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulation of policy tools, focuses on pupils’ standardised assessments</td>
<td>Knowledge-based research findings</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional feedbacks (rumours, interpersonal networks, bureaucratic data)</td>
<td>Denunciation of school rankings</td>
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</table>
In the French case, the process of assimilating change has proved much more complicated, mainly because of a powerful tradition of professional autonomy. From the central and public policy perspective, there has been a widespread discourse on results-based steering and a gradual institutionalisation of the logics of accountability. There is a narrow range of formal tools, however, which are weakly articulated with pedagogy and learning outcomes. The process of organisational change has been contested, with local traditions playing a role in the degree of assimilation. The process has, at best, been an incremental one. There are various mechanisms of contractualisation and accountability, including a yearly ‘monitoring meeting’ (‘dialogue de gestion’) which concerns only headteachers. One of the most significant narratives lies in the importance of preserving professional autonomy (hence limiting pedagogical oversight), while sharing the broad aim of success for all. This explains the narrow focus of management tools, which are intended to allow professional actors to explore the meaning of their actions (‘se rendre compte’) rather than being accountable stricto sensu (‘rendre des comptes’). Moreover, statistics in relation to pupils’ results are benchmarked but not shared publicly. There are no self-monitoring tools, unlike in Quebec.

**Conclusion**

As a whole, transparency mechanisms are embedded in accountability practices, which depend on organisational routines, professional roles and hierarchies. The above evidence suggests that transparency has more currency in the Quebec case than in the French one. In France, the tools of evaluation and accountability reveal divided institutional cultures between the administrative (ministerial) and pedagogical (teaching) hierarchies; the attempt to develop a form of results-based steering and to strengthen management tools has been resisted. School-level autonomy is weak, because the headteacher is a weak actor, while the teaching inspectors exercise power and authority in the educational policy forum.

In Quebec, the monitoring tools foster a coupling process that leads to a ‘management of pedagogy’, because the main efficient stakeholder of the forum is the school council. Greater school autonomy is evidenced by the fact that users play a more powerful role, while headteachers coordinate the cooperation between units in charge of producing and analysing data (on the school climate, absences, pupils at risk of non-graduation, test scores, and so on). School heads perform a much more important role in terms of guiding pedagogical services and liaising with various professional ‘learning communities’, and with the staff of the school boards in charge of supervising accountability procedures and instruments.

France and Quebec correspond to different types of educational regulation. Neither France nor Quebec score very highly in terms of formal, constraining accountability. In the case of
France, professional influences are powerful, limiting formal, school-level accountability. Professional identity limits somewhat the extent to which schools emerge as genuine institutions. In the Quebec case, there are rather more instruments available, but these are mainly of a soft character, involving reflexive responses rather than hard-edged indicators and resource-based decisions, as in the model of the English case considered above by Morel.
13. References


Herbert Quandt Stiftung foundation


