Normative Values in Adult Education and their Contemporary Relevance[1]

W. John Morgan.

Introduction

Chancellor, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Although I was a member of the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission for the United Kingdom for six years, I find, somewhat to my surprise, that this is only my second visit to India. The first took place as long ago as 1994, when I was the guest of that distinguished figure in Indian adult education, Dr K. S. Pillai, of the University of Kerala, who passed away in 2008. I was proud to contribute an essay to the volume published in his honour (Nair, 2003). A year ago, the International Institute of Adult and Lifelong Education honoured me with an appointment as Distinguished Professor; and it is a further honour to be invited to give the annual James A. Draper Lecture. I thank you Chancellor on behalf of the Institute, and Professor S.Y. Shah, for both honours and for your kind hospitality.

I must, of course, begin by saying something about Professor James A. Draper in whose memory this annual Lecture is held. A Canadian, he was a distinguished adult educator committed to the values of community education so characteristic of his home country. It is for this reason that I have chosen to speak on normative values in adult education and to consider whether they continue to have any relevance to contemporary adult education. I am confident that it is a topic of which James Draper would have approved. It is a very large question, with philosophical, anthropological, historical and political implications. In consequence and especially given the circumstances and time available, what I have to say will be in three parts. First, I will consider some theoretical concepts, drawn from the disciplines mentioned above. Secondly, I will consider three case studies by way of example and illustration. Finally, I will draw some conclusions as to contemporary relevance.

Concepts of Definition and of Purpose

First, there is the persistent problem of definition. What is meant by the term 'adult education '? This has been considered at great length by many commentators. You will be familiar with these arguments, certainly those of colleagues such as James Draper himself, of Malcolm S. Knowles, from the United States, and perhaps of my former colleagues J. E. Thomas, K. H. Lawson and Alan Rogers from the United Kingdom. This is not the place for a review of such literature. In my own work, both in teaching and in writing, I have followed an essentially pragmatic approach that has assumed adult education to mean that education which takes place in a structured or semi-structured way, with specific and commonly agreed goals of learning and understanding, but outside the formal and accredited structures of teaching, examination and awards. The acquisition of skills, such as literacy or numeracy, should be contributory to adult education, but not essential to it. This may seem surprising, even heretical, to many of you, and I will attempt to justify this later.

Secondly, there is the fundamental question of the purpose of education and who decides this. As long ago as 1947, the celebrated anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski in *Freedom and Civilization*, his posthumously published work, argued that there was a clear relationship between education and freedom and 'Thus the understanding of educational mechanisms and conditions is essential to our appreciation of the reality of freedom as it occurs differentially in human societies.' (Malinowski: 142-143). Interestingly, he says also that: 'Taking education in its widest sense, we see readily that it

[1] The James A, Draper Memorial Lecture, New Delhi (2009), republished in *International Dimensions of Adult and Lifelong Learning* (2016), S. Y. Shah and K.C. Choudhary (Eds.), International Institute of Adult and Lifelong Education, New Delhi, Chapter 4, pages 40-58. A further revised version.

is a process which lasts through life. Every new status which an individual acquires, every new condition of life, such as marriage, parenthood, maturity, and old age, have to be learned, in that the individual has to adjust gradually and by the acquisition of new attitudes, new ideas, and also new social duties and responsibilities.' (Malinowski: 141). The purpose of education he says is to transform '…the immature, unequipped, and untutored young animal into a social being, a tribesman, or a citizen who emerges with abilities to think, to act, and to respond in co-operation with other human beings.' (Malinowski: 141). He concludes by comparing the educational systems of totalitarianisms with those of democracies, arguing that the former shapes the individual as a means to an end, whereas the latter aims at a responsible personality, with the ability to decide purposes and loyalties, to take initiatives and make creative contributions to society. (Malinowski: 151).

Theodore Brameld, in a paper on the central purpose of American education, which cites Malinowski, develops this when he makes the fundamental point that '…education, conceived in an anthropological sense as the pivotal transmitter and innovator of cultural evolution, is forever involved in teaching and learning both the personal and the institutional norms of the communities it serves.' He goes on to say that: ‗Aside from the question, at the moment, of which norms are desirable and which are not, education it is safe to say, has never been and will never be clearly understood so long as its purpose is framed primarily in methodological terms.' (Brameld: 185). Brameld was considering the institutions and practice of American formal education, but wisely extended his concept of education to that which '…is embodied in the cultural meanings of real people-above all in their personal and public goals and then spelled out in institutional charters that select among alternatives in definite time and place.' As Malinowski had advised (Brameld: 184).

Thirdly, this raises the problems of power and ideology and of values and norms in education generally and in adult education specifically. These have, again, been the subjects of an extensive literature and yet, I argue, the implications have not been fully thought through in our current practice of adult education which is now heavily geared to the instrumental delivery of programmes. The concept of power is a contested one with definitions ranging from the individual capacity to achieve one's ends in social relationships emphasized by Max Weber, which raises the notions of agency and intentionality, to that of Karl Marx which considers power to be a consequence of the class structure of society, and which is not dependent on the will or intentions of individuals. Examples of power as a concept in educational theory and its use in educational practice should come readily to mind.

Let us consider the concept of ideology. At one level it is used to denote a system of ideas without the implication that these ideas are necessarily false and to depict a set of beliefs specific to a certain class or group. This is a common usage of the term in social science. According to Marx and Engels, who are not yet without value in social science analysis, the dominant ideology in a society must be the ideology of the ruling class and ideological positions are a function of class positions. By contrast, 'false consciousness '(a term first used by Engels) is one that does not match the objective class position. In *The German Ideology*, first published in 1846, they state clearly the connection between class power and ideology:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. (Marx and Engels: 64).

This brings us to the related concepts of values and norms and their use in educational discourse generally. Malinowski, in the book to which I referred earlier, focused on a fundamental value, that of freedom and its connection with another value which he prized, that of civilization. He considered also the role that education played in creating and sustaining both; and his anthropological analysis emphasized the conditions in which this takes place:

The individual is never free or bond except through his relation to socially organized groups. His birth right is defined by his parentage. His educational opportunities depend on the status of his parents, on their wealth, and on their rank. His acceptance into co-operative groups is a social act in which he depends on others. The act of choosing is once more determined by the range of purposes within a culture, and by social as well as personal considerations affecting the possibilities of choice. (Malinowski: 148).

The eminent biologist, Julian Huxley, distinguished also as the first Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946, adds to this when he makes the connection between Mankind 's physical and cultural evolution. He comments that although human evolution has been operating for only a tiny fraction of geological time:

Most extraordinary in principle, it has generated values. No one can prove that values play a part in the process of biological evolution, but no one can deny that they do so in human affairs. In lower organisms, the only ultimate criterion is survival: but in man some experiences and actions, some objects and ideas, are valued for their own sake. The ideologically most important fact about evolution is that the human species is now the spearhead of the evolutionary process on earth, the only portion of the stuff of which our planet is made which is capable of further progress. (Huxley: 103). Importantly for our purpose today, Huxley goes on to say:

It is often asserted that science can have no concern with values. On the contrary, in all fields of Social Science, and (in rather a different way) wherever the applications of Natural Science touch social affairs and affect human living, science must take account of values, or it will not be doing its job satisfactorily. The population problem makes this obvious. As soon as we recall that population is merely a collective term for aggregations of living human beings, we find ourselves thinking about relations between quantity and quality—quantity of human beings in the population and quality of the lives that they lead: in other words, values. (Huxley: 188).

In practice, such values are set out as the norms that govern human behaviour in society, as both Malinowski and Huxley indicate. The concept of norms is a fundamental one in moral philosophy as it constitutes a rule or at least a pattern for behaviour that is acceptable to the society which lays it down. As Simon Blackburn has pointed out:

Indeed, almost all aspects of human behaviour will be to some extent norm governed. The nature of norms, the source of their authority, and the form they should take, occupy centre-stage in any theory of ethics, philosophy of language and of law and they also play at least a major role in distinguishing the human sciences or *Geistwissenschaften* from the natural sciences. (Blackburn: 265).

And, one should add, any theory or philosophy of education or of adult education. This was recognized by, among others, G.H. Bantock (1952; 1965) and by the analytical philosopher R.S. Peters (1965; 1973). Peters 'work was adapted in the field of adult education by R.W.K. Paterson (1979) and by K. H. Lawson (1975; 1998) in Britain and by M. L. Monette (1979) in the United States. It is not my intention to review this or subsequent work in detail here, other than to say that while each claimed to be working in the analytical tradition of philosophy, the value-free analysis to which

this aspired was not in fact achieved. Instead, as Elias and Merriam (1995:190) point out, Paterson and Lawson, while they argued for a value free adult education in respect of social purpose and relevance to the real world of the adult student, paradoxically: '…move from the analysis of concepts to normative statements about the issues they examine.' As Elias and Merriam conclude: 'It may be impossible to avoid value decisions in these areas. While analysts often argue for taking neutral positions on social questions, the actual practice of education often makes this impossible '(1995:200).

Intellectuals, Modernization and Normative Education

Let us now consider how normative values are formed and how they are transmitted. Anthropologically, as both Malinowski and Huxley showed, they are formed through the relationship of culture and evolution. At first, culture is related directly to mankind 's biological needs. As culture becomes more complex, it enlarges the scope and the efficiency of human endeavour and the purpose that drives it, with individuals and societies working to obtain, maintain, and develop that which they value. Thus, as Malinowski observes:

We find that value is the prime mover in human existence. It pervades all forms of activity and is the driving force throughout culture. Man is moved to effort, not under an immediate physiological drive, but instructed by traditional rule, moved by learned motive and controlled by value. Man works to obtain the thing he values, whether this is be an object, a way of life or a belief. (Malinowski: 137).

Intellectuals have had a fundamental role in elaborating, codifying and explaining such cultural value systems and societal norms. They are to be found in non-literate societies in the role of shamans, magicians and priests and in literate societies as philosophers, theologians, poets, dramatists and novelists, academic scholars and lawyers. In modern societies the definition of an intellectual is contested. It has sometimes given rise to a distinction between educated specialists and technicians with so-called limited interests and those with wider social and ideological interests, equally so-called ‗direct producers in the sphere of ideology and culture.' (Williams: 170) or those who, as an educated cultural élite: ‗...contribute directly to the creation, transmission and criticism of ideas.' (Bottomore: 70) During the 20th century the latter became known in modern societies as 'public intellectuals', (Collini, 2006).

According to Antonio Gramsci, while everyone is capable of intellectual activity, not all have the function of intellectuals. He makes the further distinction between the traditional intellectuals of bourgeois society---the priests, doctors, university professors, lawyers and so on---and those worker intellectuals who were organically related to their class. Both were, however, the active, conscious, perpetual persuaders for the ideology that represented the objective interests of their class. He argued also that the working class did not possess, or at least not in sufficient numbers, organic intellectuals who could carry out this function effectively enough to challenge the hegemony of bourgeois society. It was pointless, he argued, to expect traditional intellectuals to carry out this task on behalf of the mass of people. This had to be undertaken by what he described as 'organic' intellectuals, rooted in the working class. We all know such intellectuals, intelligent and well-informed, although not necessarily formally educated or even literate, but active as leaders of their class and community. But Gramsci went further and allocated to a vanguard Communist Party the task of creating such 'organic' intellectuals and autonomous class-based organizations capable of replacing bourgeois institutions and cultural hegemony.

This, he said, could be achieved through a dialectical political-educational relationship between the Communist Party and the working masses (Morgan, 1987a; Morgan, 2002). This is fundamentally different from the centralized, authoritarian and dogmatic rule of Stalinist communism.

In the 20th century intellectuals, both traditional and organic, became more and more engaged in and committed to the modernization of societies, with the educator, either professional or otherwise, playing a fundamental part. The characteristics of modernization and of modernity are well known involving the development of democratic political institutions, of a technologically driven economy, of social and cultural change, together with a secular and educated citizenry capable of making a social, political and economic contribution to the public good. This was accompanied by the decline of religious, aristocratic and other traditional authority. Max Weber explains this, in the context of modern Germany, through the idea of the ‗nation' and its cultural mission, led by nationalist intellectuals, which was so powerful in the 19th and 20th centuries, commenting: ‗By ‗intellectuals' we understand a group of men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be ‗culture values' and who therefore usurp the leadership of a ‗culture community.' (Weber: 176). The roles of the university professor, of the schoolteacher, and of the adult educator, both in terms of skills development and technological knowledge and training and in the transmission of normative values, may be inferred from this quite easily.

Modernization theory is not only an analytical paradigm of course, but also an ideological statement of normative values, given shape and coherence by intellectuals. At the same time, the criticisms of modernization as essentially Occidental and ethnocentric; as not contributing evenly and justly (another normative statement) to economic development and to human welfare; and as having a profoundly negative effect on traditional societies, have also been articulated by intellectuals. Education and cultural development, including adult education, became increasingly contested instruments by which to advance the normative claims of modernization and modernity and their alternatives. However, as T.B. Bottomore pointed out, himself normatively, almost fifty years ago, it was not enough for élites to be capable and efficient in their leadership, but: ‗They must also express adequately, and pursue steadfastly, the ideals of those social classes which constitute the great majority of the population and which are struggling at the present time [1964] to escape from their age-old confinement to a life of poverty and subservience.' (Bottomore: 110).

Normative Values in Adult Education

I wish now to turn specifically to normative values in adult education and how they have been developed within the context of what I have described. Despite Malinowski's observation that, anthropologically, education is, in all societies, a lifelong and usually informal process of adaptation to changing circumstance, adult education, as it developed in the 20th century, was part of the process of modernization, whether in its capitalist or its socialist versions. Moreover, it was led by intellectuals, of one type or the other, motivated by normative values about the kind of society they wished to see established either nationally or internationally. Such normative values were made explicit through commitment to a coherent social and political ideology, if not necessarily to a specific political party.

To illustrate this, I will consider three examples, each based on the contribution of a significant adult educator; although other examples could have served my purpose equally well. The examples I have chosen are: Alexander Alexandrovitch Bogdanov (1873-1928) and proletarian education and culture in Bolshevik Russia; Richard Henry Tawney (1880-1962) and workers 'education in British social democracy; and Paulo Freire (1921-1997) and radical adult education in Brazil. The essentially normative and ideological features of each will, I believe, be apparent.

Bogdanov and Proletarian Education and Culture

I begin with a fascinating early Russian Soviet experiment in adult education and cultural development which, although well-known to historians of the communist movement, is relatively unknown to adult educators. This is perhaps surprising given the interest they have shown in Antonio Gramsci, with whom Bogdanov has been compared (Sochur, 1981). I have dealt with these issues in detail elsewhere, notably in Communists on Education and Culture 1848-1948 (See Morgan, 2003a). It is a complex subject and what I say here is a summary intended to illustrate the normative intentions of Bogdanov ‘s programme of proletarian education and culture.

It stemmed from the failure of the Russian revolution of 1905-1906, after which some Bolsheviks believed it necessary that the proletarian dictatorship, when it came, should shape its own culture directly. The key exponent of this view was the medical doctor Alexander A. Bogdanov (real name Malinovsky) and his followers in the *Vpered* (Forward) group, which opposed Lenin ‘s ideas on party organization and tactics. Bogdanov believed it necessary that a working-class intelligentsia should be created that would control the Russian revolutionary movement and guide it from a strictly proletarian perspective. As a contribution to this, Bogdanov established Party schools for workers at Bologna and Capri in 1909 and 1910, in collaboration with the writer Maxim Gorky and the philosopher Anatoly Lunarcharsky (to be People ‘s Commissar for Education following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917). Bogdanov ‘s normative values were ultra-leftist, and he was in open ideological dispute with Lenin thereafter, although he maintained a precarious membership of the Bolshevik Party. As Sochor points out, Bogdanov believed: ‗…that bourgeois intellectuals who genuinely adopted the workers‘ point of view were as rare as ―white crows.‖ The liberation of the workers to be authentic, had to be ―a matter for the workers themselves‘(Sochor: 62).

Following the Bolshevik Revolution Bogdanov became the leading figure in the Organization of Representatives of Proletarian Culture, generally known by its Russian acronym *Proletkul’t.* The Revolution and the utopian fever of the Civil War years saw the *Proletkul’t* attract large numbers of enthusiastic supporters, establish a network of local clubs and branches, and encourage those writers and artists that its ideological decision-makers regarded as authentically proletarian ‘. The movement founded newsletters and popular journals for the stimulation and dissemination of proletarian culture among the masses. Its example was followed by revolutionaries elsewhere, notably in Italy where an Institute of Proletarian Culture was set up in Turin in 1918 by Gramsci. Bogdanov envisaged the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat ‘as being three-pronged: controlling politics, the economy and culture. He believed that the proletariat should assume cultural leadership and direct education and cultural development from a clear proletarian perspective. Bogdanov was also a radical internationalist and wanted a world language of communication, presciently suggesting English which he said was ‘concise, simple and rich in cognate words ‘(cited in Morgan, 2003a: 133). He envisaged: ‗…a creative revolution of world culture, with spontaneous education and struggle of social forms replaced by conscious creation—a matter of a new class logic, new methods of unifying forces, new methods of thinking ‘(Cited in Sochur: 66).

Lenin ‘s opposition to Bogdanov was characteristically uncompromising, his own attitude having been set out in the pamphlet Party Organization and Party Literature as early as 1905. He asserted that communism could be built only on the knowledge that humanity had accumulated over the centuries. Bogdanov ‘s views were rejected as idealistic and divisive. Significantly, Trotsky supported Lenin, arguing that the Russian proletariat had come to power before it could assimilate bourgeois culture and should concentrate on doing so in order to build a modern socialist state. The significance of the dispute has been emphasized by Ballestrem:

Lenin and Bogdanov disagreed about Marxism ‘, i.e. on the interpretation of Marx ‘s thought and what the ideology of the Party should look like. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the importance of this struggle for the development of the communist movement (Ballestrem: 283; cited in Morgan, 2003a: 132).

Bogdanov was committed to the normative values of ultra-leftism which he wished to see applied to education and culture, as well as to all other aspects of economy and society; although he believed them to be derived scientifically from Marxism. By the time of Lenin ‘s death in 1924, Bogdanov had been marginalized and the *Proletkul’t*, such of it as remained, effectively subordinated to the Communist Party. This had a different set of normative values: industrialization and modernization in pursuit of the Stalinist goal of ‗socialism in one country.‘ Human as well as material resources were now to be used and disciplined in pursuit of this objective; adult education was to focus on basic skills of literacy and numeracy, on industrial training and the formation of technicians, and on the shaping ideologically of *Homo Sovieticus*. Henceforward, education, culture and the intellect were to serve the interests of Party and State. Bogdanov, a medical doctor, died in 1928 following a self-administered experiment in blood-transfusion which he had pioneered.

Tawney and Workers’ Adult Education

From a failed, relatively little known, and utopian normative attempt at mass adult education and cultural development in Soviet Russia, I turn to one that is very well-known and, arguably, was successful in achieving its normative aims. I take the English economic historian Richard Henry Tawney as an ideal representative of this movement, although others, notably Robert Peers and Hugh Gaitskell, later a leader of the Labour Party, from my own University (Brown, 1981; Morgan, 1987b: 1-9) and, later in the 20th century, the well-known Welsh social critic Raymond Williams (Morgan and Preston, 1993) and Richard Hoggart, literary critic and Assistant Director-General of UNESCO, might also have been chosen. Again, I have written in detail on aspects of this topic elsewhere, although not specifically on Tawney (Morgan, 1988; Morgan, 2003b).

The life and work of Richard Henry Tawney is well-known and the subject of scholarly biographies, with perhaps the most valuable from the point of view of the adult educator being that of Ross Terrill (1974). It is worth mentioning his close family connections with India and his subsequent educational formation. He was born in Calcutta; his father, a Sanskrit scholar, was a member of the Indian Education Service and principal of Presidency College. Tawney was educated at Rugby School, an English public school moulded in the tradition of gentlemanly leadership and social service by Thomas Arnold, and at Balliol College, an Oxford college which followed a similar tradition. This and his Anglican Christian faith led him in 1903 to undertake volunteer social welfare work at Toynbee Hall in the poverty blighted East End of London, which was his first taste of what we would now call non-formal adult education and its potential as social policy. The caste nature of such social reform work is indicated by the fact that Tawney was the brother-in-law of William Beveridge, the architect of the modern system of social insurance in Britain. The other significant experience in Tawney ‘s early formation was his service as an infantry sergeant during the First World War in which he was wounded. This is recorded in his graphic memoir *The Attack*. (Tawney, 1953: 11-20).

Tawney ‘s great contribution to adult education is to be found essentially in his untiring work for the Workers ‘Educational Association in which he became active on its formation in 1903 by another significant figure, Albert Mansbridge. It was to be a life-time commitment, especially after 1908 with the development of a partnership with the universities through a joint-tutorial class system. Tawney was to serve on the WEA’ Executive Committee for forty-two years and as president from 1928 until 1945. It gave him full opportunity to apply and to develop his normative values. As his biographer

Terrill says 'Life in the WEA made him a socialist; work in the WEA made him an economic historian. In turn, he gave tutorial classes in England the spirit of comradeship in study which was their genius '(Terrill: 37). Tawney set out his normative vision, which he did not regard as an utopia, for education in general, and for adult education in, in an almost unceasing flow of articles, reviews and pamphlets. He was, for instance, for many years a leader writer for that influential liberal newspaper The Manchester Guardian.

I shall consider two, published almost fifty years apart. The first is his essay 'An Experiment in Democratic Education 'that appeared in *The Political Quarterly*, May 1914, and later re-published by the W.E.A. as a pamphlet. It is interesting as an example of his early interest in education policy generally; he was later to become a pioneer of the Labour Party's policy of secondary education for all, setting out the arguments in a short book originally published in 1922 (Tawney, 2003). The essential task that he saw was: _…to enable all to develop the faculties which, because they are the attributes of man, are not the attributes of any particular class or profession of men '(Tawney, 1964: 77). The task of the W.E.A., was to articulate the educational aspirations of working people, building on a century of independent working-class educational effort; something which I have considered elsewhere (Morgan, 1988) Tawney comments in a memorable phrase: _Like all working-class movements, the Workers' Educational Association moves in a path worn smooth by the vanguard of the anonymous.' (Tawney, 1964:79).

In 'The WEA and Adult Education ', a lecture delivered almost forty years later on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Workers 'Educational Association, Tawney had this to say:

The purpose of an adult education worthy of the name is not merely to impart reliable information, important though that is. It is still more to foster the intellectual vitality to master and use it, so that knowledge becomes…a stimulus to constructive thought and an inspiration to action. All serious educational movements have in England been also social movements…Our Association is no exception. (Tawney, 1964: 88).

In short, Tawney, a deeply ethical Christian socialist, regarded education essentially as a social dynamic and valued adult education: _…not only as a means of developing individual character and capacity, but as a preparation for the exercise of social rights and responsibilities.' (Tawney, 1964: 90). I have said nothing of his two influential social democratic texts The Acquisitive Society (1937) and Equality (1964) or of his scholarly work, notably Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1938). Tawney died in 1962 and, at a Memorial Service on the 8th February that year, he was described, by no less a person than Hugh Gaitskell, as: _…the greatest socialist philosopher of his generation…the Democratic Socialist par excellence-an idealist who was rationalist, a believer in liberty and equality-a man who loved his faith.' (Tawney, 1964: 221).

Freire and Radical Adult Education

My final example is certainly the best known to contemporary adult educators, although in my opinion it is often misunderstood. Paulo Freire has become an icon to radical educators. This has led to some uncritical, even embarrassingly pious, assessments of his life and work. This is unfortunate given that his achievements were considerable. One of five children, his father died when he was thirteen and the family experienced poverty during the 1930s. However, he won a scholarship and completed his secondary education. He studied at the University of Reçife while working as a part-time teacher of Portuguese, qualified as an advocate, but turned to social work as his vocation. A Roman Catholic from a poor Brazilian family, his normative values were as shaped by his personal experience, as by his formal intellectual education.

In 1958, while completing a doctorate, Freire began experimenting with literacy programmes among the workers of the cane plantations near Reçife. On his appointment to the university he began a programme of action research on the teaching of illiterate adults among the urban and rural poor of north-eastern Brazil. This led him to his core normative values in adult education. He argued that mass literacy should be an organic part of a process of consciousness-raising, through which those he regarded as oppressed would acquire a critical awareness of the society in which they lived and of their potential capacity to transform it. He argued that his goal was to establish: ‗a literacy programme which could be an introduction to the democratization of culture '(Freire, 1976: 43). Later he was to say:

…the pedagogy of the oppressed cannot be developed or practised by the oppressors. It would be a contradiction in terms if the oppressors not only defended but actually implemented a liberating education… [there is a] distinction between systematic education, which can only be changed by political power, and educational projects, which should be carried out with the oppressed in the process of organizing them. (Freire, 1972: 30-31).

Freire 's ideas and programmes were received with excitement in a Brazil that seemed on the threshold of democratization. The Roman Catholic Church was becoming active in the *Moviemento de Educação de Base* (MEB) and Freire 's ideas became part of the liberation theology movement, Freire describing himself as 'a man of faith '. Their success was demonstrated in 1961 when they helped almost three hundred adults in the state of Rio Grande de Norte to become literate in less than two months, with some learning to read and write after just thirty hours of support. Freire insisted that there was no text without context 'and rooted literacy skills in the daily experience of the readers, discussing critically the meaning of a word before identifying it as a graphic symbol.

The election of the populist president João Goulart led to Freire gaining state backing. By June 1963 his literacy teams were at work throughout Brazil with Freire appointed head of a National Commission of Popular Culture. He now aimed to make five million underprivileged and disenfranchised people literate and politically aware within five years. This was a radical campaign of mass mobilization since, according to the Brazilian Constitution, such people, once literate, became eligible to vote. This gave the campaign an immediate and dramatic political significance. It was ended by the coup d'état of 21st March 1964, which began twenty-one years of military rule in Brazil. The National Commission on Popular Culture was disbanded, and Freire went into exile, after a short period of imprisonment. In so doing, the military junta intended to censor Freire 's ideas and end his work and influence. Ironically, however, it gave him the opportunity of gaining reflective distance, the experience of different contexts for the practice of his ideas, and to be in contact with educators throughout the world.

As a result, his intellectual influence increased enormously. It was during these years that his most significant work, notably *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972a), *Cultural Action for Freedom* (1972b) and *Education: The Practice of Freedom* (1976) were written. A prolific, influential and polemical writer, although criticized for vagueness and an over-eclectic incoherence, Freire 's work has given rise to a considerable secondary literature, much of it itself polemical rather than analytical. One of the clearest expositions which pays attention to the ethical and normative aspects of Freire 's work is that by Peter Roberts (2000), although even that neglects the influence on Freire of his Roman Catholic Christian faith. Freire was able to return to Brazil in 1979 to teach at the State University of São Paulo. He was a founder member of the left-wing Workers' Party and was from 1989 to 1991 secretary for education in the state of São Paulo. He died in 1997, but his work and normative vision of a radical adult education remain enormously influential world-wide.

The Contemporary Relevance of Normative Adult Education

Each of the examples illustrates a normative attempt at adult education through social movements. Each was led by an intellectual, educated in the traditional formal manner, but committed to specific goals of égalitarianism, to an anti-capitalist liberation and to a socialist society. In each case the acquisition of skills such as literacy or numeracy was a means to an end, rather than the end itself. There were, of course, profound differences ontologically and normatively which I shall consider by way of conclusion. Bogdanov was a Marxist revolutionary and ultra-leftist atheist who advocated a fundamental cultural revolution and the effective obliteration and replacement of bourgeois cultural values by those developed independently by the proletarian masses. As in the case of Antonio Gramsci, the hegemony of proletarianism was intended to be as all-encompassing as that which it was to replace. Those who recommend such a course should consider the historical examples of the English Civil War and of the Jacobins of the French Revolution, as well as the more recent examples of Mao Zedong 's *Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution* and Pol Pot 's *Year Zero*. The fact that the history of the *Proletkul't* was part of the struggle for the ideological control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union bent on an hegemonic domination of education, culture and society should be considered as part of the terrible warning. (Morgan, 2003a).

Tawney was a cultured Englishman motivated by the norms of an ethical and Anglican Christian socialism. The adult education mission that he and others undertook, through the W.E.A., and related organizations, can now hardly be found in Britain, while Tawney himself is no longer as widely known or appreciated as his achievement deserves. Adult education is now seen as essentially something instrumental, either purely recreational for the individual or as a means to human capital, enhancing capacity to function in the labour market. That said, Tawney 's mission was successful in that it made a fundamental contribution to the foundations of a democratic welfare state in post-war Britain from which many millions, including myself benefitted. However, it is important to note that New Labour, elected to government in Britain in 1997 under the leadership of Tony Blair, has shown virtually no interest in R. H. Tawney, his ethical socialism and normative philosophy of adult education.

Paulo Freire was a dedicated adult educator who achieved near messianic status among his many followers. The eclecticism or, at best, syncretism of his writings has enabled them to select what best suits their own ideological or normative purpose. That said, there is no doubt of the value of Freire's work and of his concern to develop a dialogical approach aimed at the educational self-enlightenment and potential cultural liberation from below of the poor and the dispossessed, not only of Brazil but wherever they may be found. This is a normative value for adult education which requires a profound degree of commitment, even self-sacrifice on the part of the educator. It perhaps explains Freire 's observation that 'An educator is a person who has to live in the deep significance of Easter '(Cited in Taylor: 55). Which of us is capable of understanding, let alone sustaining that in the way that Paulo Freire did?

What is the contemporary relevance of normative adult education? As Simon Blackburn stated, all aspects of human behaviour are, to some extent, norm governed. We cannot escape this in life generally and neither can we in our contemporary practice of adult education. Anthropologically and historically, normative values are derived from the collective life experiences of individuals within communities as they seek, first to survive, then to achieve security and stability and, finally, to reach prosperity and harmony. As I stated earlier, traditionally such normative social values were clarified, coded and made ideologically coherent by intellectuals, whose role was to educate the population in them. It was also their function to adapt the system to changing economic and social circumstances. In some cases, as we have seen, rival values systems emerge, each supported by its own intellectuals

and the traditional society was challenged, either through cultural revolution (Bogdanov), through gradual social change (Tawney) or through radical action, but within existing society (Freire).

However, as J. G. Finlayson has pointed out, in our pluralistic, globalized and, in some respects, post-modern world, universal moral principles and ethical ideals of perfectionism can appear as '…no more than the ingrained cultural or ethno-centric prejudices of a particular community. Hence, it is better to avoid morally based social criticism '(Finlayson: 32). This is a problem, as it suggests a value-free social theory analogous to medical diagnosis or to the design of a transport system (Finlayson: 40).

As Jurgen Habermas has argued, it is a fundamental problem for intellectuals who practise critical theory that, from the beginning, it '…labored over the difficulty of giving an account of its own normative foundations… '(Habermas: 374; cited in Finlayson: 7).

It is certainly a problem that faces us as adult educators in the contemporary world. Can we offer sufficiently clear and justified normative values for what we do? Do we indeed still think of such moral questions as fundamentally important in the way that Bogdanov, Tawney and Freire did? In this century it has been difficult, certainly in the developed Occidental world, to think of examples of adult education as a normative social movement. Is it different elsewhere? Does, for instance, the normative educational philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi still inspire the practice of adult education in India? (Sharma, 2008). Again, is the *Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad* with its challenge 'Science for Social Revolution? 'that I remember from a previous visit to India, still a vital force? (Zacahariah and Sooryamoorthy, 1994). Again, it is not enough to simply take down from the shelf and adopt a set of normative values elaborated by a *guru* from different times and circumstances, however valuable and inspiring. We must think these issues through for ourselves in our own times and circumstances.

Finally, there is another objection: that of historicism. This suggests that the normative values of adult educators are examples of the grand designs of intellectuals. A similar point was made by John Goldthorpe when he argued that such historicist thinking should be regarded as: _…not only mistaken but further as morally and politically deleterious: that is as encouraging irrationalism and denying choice.' He congratulated the British working-class for '…its refusal to fit in with any of the attempts at historicist, or crypto-historicist, pattern-making that intellectuals have sought to impose upon it' (Goldthorpe: 17). These are uncomfortable thoughts, in these politically–correct days, and for those who work according to slogans such as 'Knowledge is Power!' or 'Education is Capital!' Raymond Aron, in his classic book *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, asked the question, ignored by intellectuals, and by implication adult educators, in their enthusiasms, that is still relevant today and to which each of us should consider our answer:

Will one cease to desire a less unjust society and a less cruel lot for humanity as a whole if one refuses to subscribe to a single class, a single technique of action and a single ideological system?... If tolerance is born of doubt, let us teach everyone to doubt all the models and utopias…let us pray for the advent of the skeptics (Aron: 322-323).

Chancellor, Ladies and Gentlemen: I thank you for your attention.

Bibliography

R. Aron, (1962), The Opium of the Intellectuals, W. W. Norton and Co., New York.

K. G. Ballestrem, (1969), 'Lenin and Bogdanov 'Studies in Soviet Thought, No. 9,

pp 283-310.

G. H. Bantock, (1952), Freedom and Authority in Education, Faber and Faber, London.

G. H. Bantock, (1965), Education and Values, Faber and Faber, London.

S. Blackburn, (1996), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

T. B. Bottomore, (1964), Elites and Society, Penguin Books, Harmandsworth.

T. Brameld, (1970), _What is the Central Purpose of American Education? 'A. Dupuis, (Ed.), Nature, Aims and Policy, University of Illinois Press, Urbana-Chicago and London, pp. 179-189.

G. F. Brown, (1981), Robert Peers and the Department of Adult Education, Department of Adult Education, University of Nottingham, Nottingham.

S. Collini, (2006), Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

J. L. Elias and S. B. Merriam, (1995), Philosophical Foundations of Adult Education, 2nd edition, Krieger Publishing Company, Malabar, Florida.

J. Habermas, (1987), The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., Polity Press, Cambridge.

J. G. Finlayson, (2009) 'Morality and Critical Theory: On the Normative Problem of Frankfurt School Social Criticism 'Telos, No. 146, Spring, pp. 7-41.

P. Freire, (1972a), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin Books, Harmandsworth.

P. Freire, (1972b), Cultural Action for Freedom, Penguin Books, Harmandsworth.

P. Freire, (1976), Education: The Practice of Freedom, Writers and Readers Cooperative, London.

J. Goldthorpe, (1980), Intellectuals and the Working Class in Modern Britain, the Fuller Bequest Lecture, University of Essex. Colchester.

J. Huxley, (1957), New Bottles for New Wine, Chatto and Windus, London.

B. Malinowski, (1947), Freedom and Civilization, Allen and Unwin, London.

K. Marx and F. Engels, (1970), The German Ideology, C. J. Arthur, (Ed.), Lawrence and Wishart, London.

K. H. Lawson, (1975), Philosophical Concepts and Values in Adult Education, Barnes and Humby, Nottingham.

K. H. Lawson, (1998), Philosophical Issues in the Education of Adults, The Continuing Education Press, Nottingham.

M. L. Monette, (1979), 'Need Assessment: A critique of philosophical assumptions ', Adult Education, No. 29, pp. 83-95.

W. J. Morgan, (1987a), 'The Pedagogical Politics of Antonio Gramsci: Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will ', International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 295-308.

W. J. Morgan, (1987b), _Introduction: Hugh Gaitskell, Democratic Socialism and Adult Education.' W. J. Morgan (Ed.), Politics and Consensus in Modern Britain: Lectures in memory of Hugh Gaitskell, The Macmillan Press, Basingstoke and London and St Martin's Press, New York, pp. 1-9.

W. J. Morgan, (1988), 'Some Political Origins of Workers' Education in Britain. 'Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 27-36.

W. J. Morgan, (2002), 'Antonio Gramsci and Raymond Williams: Workers, intellectuals and adult education. 'C. Borg, J. Buttigieg and P. Mayo (Eds.) Gramsci and Education, Rowman and Littlefield, Boulder, Col., 2002, pp. 241-262

W. J. Morgan, (2003a), Communists on Education and Culture 1848-1948, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York.

W. J. Morgan, (2003b), _Public Opinion, Political Education and Citizenship ', W. J. Morgan and S. Livingstone, (Eds.) Law and Opinion in 20th Century Britain and Ireland, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, pp. 9-31.

W, J, Morgan (2008) 'Social capital, citizenship and continuing education: What are the connections? 'International Journal of Continuing Education and Lifelong Learning, Vol.1, No. 1, pp. 35-45.

W. J. Morgan and P. Preston (Eds.), (1993), Raymond Williams: Politics, Education, Letters, The Macmillan Press, Basingstoke and London and St Martin's Press, New York.

V.S. Nair (Ed.) (2003), Emerging Facets of Education, Literacy Forum, Kerala.

R.W. K. Paterson, (1979), Values, Education and the Adult, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

R. S. Peters, (1965), Ethics and Education, Allen and Unwin, London.

R. S. Peters, (1973),'The Justification of Education. 'R.S. Peters (Ed.), The Philosophy of Education, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 239-267.

P. Roberts (2000), Education, Literacy and Humanization: Exploring the Work of Paulo Freire, Bergin and Garvery, Westport, Connecticut.

N. Sharma (2008), Makiguchi and Gandhi: Their Educational Relevance for the 21st Century, University Press of America, Lanham, USA.

Z. Sochur, (1981), 'Was Bogdanov Russia 's answer to Gramsci? 'Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 22, No. 1, February, pp. 59-81.

R.H. Tawney, (1953), The Attack and Other Papers, Allen and Unwin, London.

R. H. Tawney, (1937), The Acquisitive Society, Bell and Sons, London.

R. H. Tawney, (1964), Equality, Unwin Books, London.

R. H. Tawney, (1938), Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Penguin Books, West Drayton.

R.H. Tawney (1966), The Radical Tradition, (Ed.) Rita Hinden, Penguin Books, Harmandsworth.

R. H. Tawney, (2003), Secondary Education for All, Continuum, London.

P. V. Taylor (1993), The Texts of Paulo Freire, Open University Press, Buckingham.

R. Terrill (1974), R.H. Tawney and his Times: A Socialism of Fellowship, Andre Deutsch, London.

M. Weber, (1991), From Max Weber: Essays in sociology, H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (Eds.), Routledge, London.

R. Williams, (1983), Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society, Fontana Press, London.

M. Zachariah and R. Sooryamoorthy, (1994), Science for Social Revolution? Achievements and Dilemmas of a Development Movement: The Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad, Vistaar Publications, New Delhi.